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] Date Posted: 09:25:43 10/31/06 Tue Location Dates Agents Project Description DoD Location Dates Agents Project Description DoD . Involvement ... million gallons of Herbicide Orange at sea in an operation ... conducted jointly by CWS and the ARML to investigate the use ... www1.va.gov/agentorange/docs/Report_on_DoD_Herbicides_Outside_of_Vietnam.pdf · Cached page · PDF file Congreeman Lane Evans (Indiana) Requests Information I am also requesting an assessment of the use, testing or storage of Agent Orange, Agent Blue, Agent Purple, Agent White or other herbicides which contain dioxin, including the locations, amounts and relevant dates at the following locations and any other location for which documentation exists: Pranburi and other locations in Thailand http://www.gmasw.com/ao_out.htm The U.S. Veteran Dispatch—October 31, 2006—Publisher – Ted Sampley http://www.usvetdsp.com/agentorange.htm U.S. Veteran Dispatch Staff Report November 1990 Issue It is the war that will not end. It is the war that continues to stalk and claim its victims decades after the last shots were fired. It is the war of rainbow herbicides, Agents Orange, Blue, White, Purple, Green and Pink. This never-ending legacy of the war in Vietnam has created among many veterans and their families deep feelings of mistrust of the U.S. government for its lack of honesty in studying the effects of the rainbow herbicides, particularly Agent Orange, and its conscious effort to cover up information and rig test results with which it does not agree. STUDY CANCELED On August 2, 1990, two veteran's groups filed suit in U.S. District Court in Washington, D.C., charging that federal scientists canceled an Agent Orange study mandated by Congress in 1979 because of pressure from the White House. The four year, $43 million study was canceled, according to the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) in Atlanta, because it could not accurately determine which veterans were exposed to the herbicide used to destroy vegetation in Vietnam. The American Legion, Vietnam Veterans of America and other veteran's groups are charging a massive government cover-up on the issue of herbicide exposure because of the hundreds of millions of dollars in health care and disability claims that would have to be paid. The results of the scientific studies are rigged, claim many veterans, to exonerate the government which conducted the spraying and the chemical companies which produced the herbicides. Until there is a true study of the effects of Agent Orange, say the veterans - a study devoid of government interference and political considerations, the war of the rainbow herbicides will go on. Charges of a White House cover-up have been substantiated by a report from the House Government Operations Committee. That report, released August 9, 1990, charges that officials in the Reagan administration purposely "controlled and obstructed" a federal Agent Orange study in 1987 because it did not want to admit government liability in cases involving the toxic herbicides. Government and industry cover-ups on Agent Orange are nothing new, though. They have been going on since before the herbicide was introduced in the jungles of Vietnam in the early 1960s. PLANTS GIVEN CANCER Agent Orange had its genesis as a defoliant in an obscure laboratory at the University of Chicago during World War II. Working on experimental plant growth at the time, Professor E.J. Kraus, chairman of the school's botany department, discovered that he could regulate the growth of plants through the infusion of various hormones. Among the discoveries he made was that certain broadleaf vegetation could be killed by causing the plants to experience sudden, uncontrolled growth. It was similar to giving the plants cancer by introducing specific chemicals. In some instances, deterioration of the vegetation was noticed within 24-48 hours of the introduction of the chemicals. Kraus found that heavy doses of the chemical 2,4-dichlorophenoxyacetic acid (2,4-D) could induce these growth spurts. Thinking this discovery might be of some use in the war effort, Kraus contacted the War Department. ARMY EXPERIMENTS WITH DEADLY DEFOLIANTS The Army continued to experiment with 2,4-D during the 1950s and late in the decade found a potent combination of chemicals which quickly found its way into the Army's chemical arsenal. Army scientists found that by mixing 2,4-D and 2,4,5-trichlorophenoxyacetic acid (2,4,5-T) and spraying it on plants, there would be an almost immediate negative effect on the foliage. What they didn't realize, or chose to ignore, was that 2,4,5-T contained dioxin, a useless by-product of herbicide production. It would be twenty more years until concern was raised about dioxin, a chemical the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) would later call "one of the most perplexing and potentially dangerous" known to man. According to the Encyclopedia Britannica, "The toxicity of dioxin renders it capable of killing some species of newborn mammals and fish at levels of five parts per trillion (or one ounce in six million tons). Less than two millionths of an ounce will kill a mouse. Its toxic properties are enhanced by the fact that it can pass into the body through all major routes of entry, including the skin (by direct contact), the lungs (by inhaling dust, fumes or vapors), or through the mouth. Entry through any of these routes contributes to the total body burden. Dioxin is so toxic, according to the encyclopedia, because of this: "Contained in cell membranes are protein molecules, called receptors, that normally function to move substances into the cell. Dioxin avidly binds to these receptors and, as a result, is rapidly transported into the cytoplasm and nucleus of the cell, where it causes changes in cellular procession." After minimal experimentation in 1961, a variety of chemical agents was shipped to Vietnam to aid in anti-guerilla efforts. The chemicals were to be used to destroy food sources and eliminate foliage that concealed enemy troop movements. RAINBOW HERBICIDES The various chemicals were labeled by color-coded stripes on the barrels, an arsenal of herbicides known by the colors of the rainbow, including Agent Blue (which contained arsenic), Agent White, Agent Purple, and the lethal combination of 2,4-D and 2,4,5-T, Agent Orange. On January 13, 1962, three U.S. Air Force C-123s left Tan Son Nhut airfield to begin Operation Hades (later called Operation Ranch Hand), the defoliation of portions of South Vietnam's heavily forested countryside in which Viet Cong guerrillas could easily hide. By September, 1962, the spraying program had intensified, despite an early lack of success, as U.S. officials targeted the Ca Mau Peninsula, a scene of heavy communist activity. Ranch Hand aircraft sprayed more than 9,000 acres of mangrove forests there, defoliating approximately 95 percent of the targeted area. That mission was deemed a success and full approval was given for continuation of Operation Ranch Hand as the U.S. stepped up its involvement in Vietnam. SIX TO TWENTY-FIVE TIMES STRONGER THAN RECOMMENDED Over the next nine years, an estimated 12 million gallons of Agent Orange were sprayed throughout Vietnam. The military sprayed herbicides in Vietnam six to 25 times the rate suggested by the manufacturer. In 1962, 15,000 gallons of herbicide were sprayed throughout Vietnam. The following year that amount nearly quadrupled, as 59,000 gallons of chemicals were poured into the forests and streams. The amounts increased significantly after that: 175,000 gallons in 1964, 621,000 gallons in 1965 and 2.28 million gallons in 1966. The pilots who flew these missions became so proficient at their jobs that it would take only a few minutes after reaching their target areas to dump their 1,000-gallon loads before turning for home. Flying over portions of South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia that had been sprayed, the pilots could see the effects of their work. MAKERS KNEW OF DANGER TO HUMANS Unknown to the tens of thousands of American soldiers and Vietnamese civilians who were living, eating and bathing in a virtual omnipresent mist of the rainbow herbicides, the makers of these chemicals were well aware of their long-term toxic effects, but sought to suppress the information from the government and the public, fearing negative backlash. CONCERN OVER DIOXINS KEPT QUIET Three months later, Rowe sent a memo to Ross Mulholland, a manager with Dow in Canada, informing him that dioxin "is exceptionally toxic, it has a tremendous potential for producing chloracne (a skin disorder similar to acne) and systemic injury." The U.S. government and the chemical companies presented a united front on the issue of defoliation, claiming it was militarily necessary to deprive the Viet Cong of hiding places and food sources and that it caused no adverse economic or health effects to those who came into contact with the rainbow herbicides, particularly Agent Orange. AIR FORCE KNEW OF HEALTH DANGER But, scientists involved in Operation Ranch Hand and documents uncovered recently in the National Archives present a somewhat different picture. There are strong indications that not only were military officials aware as early as 1967 of the limited effectiveness of chemical defoliation, they knew of potential long-term health risks of frequent spraying and sought to keep that information from the public by managing news reports. Dr. James Clary was an Air Force scientist in Vietnam who helped write the history of Operation Ranch Hand. Clary says the Air Force knew Agent Orange was far more hazardous to the health of humans than anyone would admit at the time. MILITARY DOWNPLAYS USE OF HERBICIDES Aware of the concern over the use of herbicides in Vietnam, particularly the use of Agent Orange, the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), attempted to put the proper public relations spin on information concerning Operation Ranch Hand by announcing a "revision" in its policy on the use of herbicides. MIST DRIFT One of the first defoliation efforts of Operation Ranch Hand was near a rubber plantation in January, 1962. According to an unsigned U.S. Army memorandum dated January 24, 1966, titled "Use of Herbicides in Vietnam," studies showed that within a week of spraying, the trees in the plantation "showed considerable leaf fall." "The injury to the young rubber trees occurred even though the plantation was located some 500 yards away and upwind of the target at the time of the spray delivery." The memo went on to say that "vapors of the chemical were strong enough in concentration to cause this injury to the rubber." These vapors, "appear to come from `mist drift' or from vaporization either in the atmosphere or after the spray has settled on the vegetation." The issue of "mist drift" continued to plague the defoliation program. How far would it drift? How fast? Wind speed and direction were of major concerns in answering these questions. Yet, there were other questions, many of which could not be answered. What happened in humid weather? How quickly did the chemicals diffuse in the atmosphere or were they carried into the clouds and dropped dozens of miles away? How long would the rainbow herbicides linger in the air or on the ground once they were sprayed? A November 8, 1967 memorandum from Eugene M. Locke, deputy U.S. ambassador in Saigon, once again addressed the problem of "mist drift" and "significant damage" to rubber plantations from spraying earlier in the year. According to Locke, "the herbicide damage resulted from a navigational error; some trees in another plantation had been defoliated deliberately in order to enhance the security of a U.S. military camp. The bulk of the herbicide damage must be attributed, however, to the drift of herbicide through the atmosphere. This drift occurs (a) after the spray is released from the aircraft and before it reaches the ground, and/or (b) when herbicide that has already reached the ground vaporizes during the heat of the day, is carried aloft, then moved by surface winds and eventually deposited elsewhere. "There is a lack of agreement within the Mission regarding the distances over which the two kinds of drift can occur. When properly released (as required at 150 feet above the target, with winds of no more than 10 mph blowing away from nearby plantations) herbicide spray should fall with reasonable accuracy upon its intended target. The range of drift of vaporized herbicide, however, has not been scientifically established at the present time. In recognition of this phenomenon and to minimize it, current procedures require that missions may be flown only during inversion conditions, i.e., when the temperature on the land and in the atmosphere produces downward currents of air. Estimates within the Mission of vaporized herbicide drift range from only negligible drift to distances of up to 10 kilometers and more." Ten kilometers and more. More than six miles. In essence, troops operating more than six miles from defoliation operations could find themselves, their water and their food doused with chemical agents, including dioxin-laced Agent Orange. And they wouldn't even know it. More than four months later, on March 23, 1968, Gen. A.R. Brownfield, then Army Chief of Staff, sent a message to all senior U.S. advisors in the four Corps Tactical Zones (CTZ) of Vietnam. Brownfield ordered that "helicopter spray operations will not be conducted when ground temperatures are greater that 85 (degrees) Fahrenheit and wind speed in excess of 10 mph." But the concern was not for any troops operating in the areas of spraying, as was evident in the memo, but for the rubber plantations. The message ordered that "a buffer distance of at least two (2) kilometers from active rubber plantation must be maintained." No such considerations were given for the troops operating in the area. PROJECT PINK ROSE One of the U.S. government's worst planned and executed efforts to use herbicides was a secret operation known as "Project Pink Rose." According to a recently declassified report on "Project Pink Rose," the operation had its genesis in September 1965 when the Joint Chiefs of Staff received a recommendation from the Commander in Chief Pacific "to develop a capability to destroy by fire large areas of forest and jungle growth in Southeast Asia." On March 11, 1966, a test operation known as "Hot Tip" was documented at Chu Pong mountain near Pleiku when 15 B-52s dropped incendiaries on a defoliated area. According to the declassified memo, "results were inconclusive but sufficient fire did develop to indicate that this technique might be operationally functional." What neither the government nor the chemical companies told anyone was that burning dioxins significantly increases the toxicity of the dioxins. So, not only was the government introducing cancer causing chemicals into the war, it was increasing their toxicity by burning them. Nevertheless, "Project Pink Rose" continued. In November, 1966, three free strike target areas were selected: one in War Zone D and two in War Zone C. Each target was a box seven kilometers square. The target areas were double and triple canopy jungle. The areas were heavily prepped with defoliants, the government dumping 255,000 gallons on the test sites. The three sites were bombed individually, one on January 18, 1967, another January 28, 1967 and the last on April 4, 1967. According to the memo, "the order and dates of strikes were changed to properly phase Pink Rose operations with concurrent ground operations." Which means that U.S. and Vietnamese troops were living and fighting in these test sites on which 255,000 gallons of cancer causing defoliants had been dumped. The results of "Project Pink Rose" were less than favorable. According to the memo, "The Pink Rose technique is ineffective as a means of removing the forest crown canopy." The conclusion: "Further testing of the Pink Rose technique in South Vietnam under the existing concept be terminated." DEFOLIANTS DUMPED ON PEOPLE AND INTO WATER SUPPLIES In addition to the planned dumps of herbicides, accidental and intentional dumps of defoliants over populated areas and into the water supplies was not unusual, according to government documents. A memorandum for the record dated October 31, 1967, and signed by Col. W.T. Moseley, chief of MACV's Chemical Operations Division, reported an emergency dump of herbicide far from the intended target. At approximately 1120 hours, October 29, 1967, aircraft #576 made an emergency dump of herbicide in Long Khanh Province due to failure of one engine and loss of power in the other. Approximately 1,000 gallons of herbicide WHITE were dumped from an altitude of 2,500 feet. No mention was made of wind speed or direction, but chemicals dropped from that height had the potential to drift a long way. Another memorandum for the record, this one dated January 8, 1968 and signed by Col. John Moran, chief Chemical Operations Division of MACV, also reported an emergency dump of herbicide, this time into a major river near Saigon. "At approximately 1015 hours, January 6, 1968, aircraft #633 made an emergency dump over the Dong Nai River approximately 15 kilometers east of Saigon when the aircraft experienced severe engine vibration and loss of power. Approximately 1,000 gallons of herbicide ORANGE were dumped from an altitude of 3,500 feet." CHEMICAL COMPANY EMPLOYEES DEVELOP SKIN PROBLEMS And this despite evidence at the plants producing Agent Orange that workers exposed to it suffered unusual health problems. "They came out, all of them, said Brodkin. "They looked "We discovered that not only were these people getting skin disease, but they were also showing some indication of liver damage," he said. STATE DEPARTMENT EXONERATES CHEMICAL COMPANIES Part of their concern came following a November 1967 study by Yale University botany Professor Arthur Galston. Galston did some experiments with Agent Orange and other herbicides to determine whether they were dangerous to humans and animals. USE OF CHEMICALS CONTINUES IN VIETNAM While the debate over the danger of Agent Orange and dioxin heated up in scientific circles, the U.S. Air Force continued flying defoliation sorties. And the troops on the ground continued to live in the chemical mist of the rainbow herbicides. They slept with it, drank it in their water, ate it in their food and breathed it when it dropped out of the air in a fine, white pungent mist. Some of the troops in Vietnam used the empty Agent Orange drums for barbecue pits. Others stored watermelons and potatoes in them. Still others rigged the residue laden drums for showers. "They're defoliating," one of his buddies told him. Then came the mist, like clouds floating out of the back of the C-123s, soaking the men, their clothes and their food. For the next two weeks, the men of Jordan's unit suffered nausea and diarrhea. Jordan returned from Vietnam with an unusual amount of dioxin in his system. More than 15 years later, he still had 50 parts per trillion, considered abnormally high. He also had two sons born with deformed arms and hands. The spraying continued unabated in 1968, even though, according to military records, it apparently was having minimal effects on the enemy. A series of memorandums uncovered in the National Archives and now declassified indicate that defoliation killed a lot of plants, but had little real effect on military operations. ADVANTAGES VERSES DISADVANTAGES DISCUSSED As early as 1967 it had become clear that herbicide spraying was having few of the desired effects. According to an undated and unsigned USMACV memorandum, Rand Corporation studies in October 1967, concluded "that the crops destruction effort may well be counterproductive." According to the memo, "The peasant, who is the target of our long range pacification objectives, bears the brunt of the crop destruction effort and does not like it." Col. John Moran, chief of the Chemical Operations Division of MACV, wrote a memorandum dated October 3, 1968, and titled "Advantages and Disadvantages of the Use of Herbicides in Vietnam" that provides some key insights into the defoliation program. "Ecologically, according to the memorandum, "Semideciduous forests, especially in War Zone C and D, have been severely affected. The regeneration of these forests could be seriously retarded by repeated applications of herbicide." Some state that they have seen areas where the vegetation has been killed, but do not mention any infiltration problems caused by the defoliation. There are indications that US herbicide operations have had a negligible effect on NVA infiltration and combat operations." ORANGE AEROSOL DISCOVERED Meanwhile, the military continued to learn just how toxic Agent Orange could be. On October 23, 1969, an urgent message was sent from Fort Detrick, Maryland, to MACV concerning cleaning of drums containing herbicides. The message provided detailed instructions on how to clean the drums and warned that it was particularly important to clean Agent Orange drums. "Using the (Agent) Orange drums for storing petroleum products without thoroughly cleaning of them can result in creation of an orange aerosol when the contaminated petroleum products are consumed in internal combustion engines. Not only was Agent Orange being sprayed from aircraft, but it was unwittingly being sprayed out of the exhausts of trucks, jeeps and gasoline generators. "The use of herbicides was not confined to the jungles. It was widely used to suppress vegetation around the perimeters of military bases and, in many instances, the interiors of those bases. LAB TESTS ON ANIMALS CURTAIL SOME USE OF AGENT ORANGE Nevertheless, the use of Agent Orange throughout Vietnam was widespread through much of 1969. The tests revealed that as little as two parts of dioxin per trillion in the bloodstream was sufficient to cause deaths and abnormal births. And some GIs were returning home from Vietnam with 50 parts per trillion, and more, in their bloodstream. USE OF AGENT ORANGE FINALLY ENDED Despite the order, some troops continued to use Agent Orange when they ran out of the other rainbow herbicides. Finally, in early 1971, the U.S. Surgeon General prohibited the use of Agent Orange for home use because of possible harmful effects on humans and on June 30, 1971, all United States defoliation operations in Vietnam were brought to an end. VETS BEGIN DEVELOPING HEALTH PROBLEMS As soldiers who had served in Vietnam attempted to settle back into civilian life following their tours, some of them began to develop unusual health problems. There were skin and liver diseases and what seemed to be an abnormal number of cancers to soft tissue organs such as the lungs and stomach. Some veterans experienced wild mood swings, while others developed a painful skin rash known as chloracne. Many of these veterans were found to have high levels of dioxin in their blood, but scientists and the U.S. government insisted there was no link between their illnesses and Agent Orange. In the mid 1970s, there was renewed interest in dioxin and its effects on human health following an industrial accident in Seveso, Italy, in which dioxin was released into the air, causing animal deaths and human sickness. EPA BANS USE OF AGENT ORANGE IN U.S. Over the next four years, the VA examined an estimated 200,000 veterans for medical problems they claimed stemmed from Agent Orange and other herbicides used in Vietnam. But many of those examined were dissatisfied with their examinations. They claimed the exams were done poorly and often in haste by unqualified medical personnel. Many veterans also claimed that the VA seemed to have a mind set to ignore or debunk Agent Orange connected disability complaints. CLASS ACTION SUIT FILED Fed up with what they perceived as government inaction on the Agent Orange issue, veterans filed a class action lawsuit in 1982 against the chemical companies that had made Agent Orange. Among the companies named were Dow Chemical Co. of Midland, Michigan; Monsanto Co. of St. Louis, Missouri; Diamond Shamrock Corp. of Dallas, Texas; Hercules Inc. of Wilmington, Delaware; Uniroyal Inc. of Middlebury, Connecticut; Thompson Chemical Corp. of Newark, New Jersey and the T.H. Agriculture and Nutrition Co. of Kansas City, Missouri. By the early 1980s, some of the chemical companies' dirty little secrets about dioxin were beginning to leak out. TIMES BEACH Times Beach was an idyllic little community of about 2,200 residents in the rolling farmlands of eastern Missouri 20 miles southwest of St. Louis. Unknown to the residents of Times Beach, for several years in the mid 1970s, dioxin laced oil had been sprayed on the town's roads to keep down the dust. Times Beach was one of 28 eastern Missouri communities where the spraying had been done. But none of the others had the levels of dioxin contamination of Times Beach, parts of which had dioxin levels of 33,000 parts per billion, or 33,000 times more toxic than the EPA's level of acceptance. The contamination was so bad that the government decided the only way to save the town's residents from further damage from dioxin was to buy them out and move them out. AMA DOWNPLAYS DIOXIN DANGER While the government was busily buying up Times Beach and evacuating its residents, the American Medical Association was coming under attack from environmental health specialists for its stance on dioxin. STUDIES CONTRADICTORY AND CONFUSING By 1983, the results of studies of Agent Orange and dioxin exposure began to trickle in. They were, for the most part, contradictory and confusing. A series of studies conducted between 1974 and 1983 by Dr. Lennart Hardell, the so called Swedish studies, showed a link between exposure to Agent Orange and soft tissue sarcomas and non-Hodgkin's lymphoma."A lot of veterans are scared because of early news reports of physical damage, while some among any large number of people are going to have health problems such as a matter of routine natural incidence," said Dr. Barclay Shepard, director of Agent Orange Studies for the VA. "Put that together with disillusionment over the Vietnam War and anger with the government and there is little wonder that many veterans truly believe that they have in some way been hurt. LAWSUIT SETTLED - VETS WIN, BUT LOSE Then on May 7, 1984, came the news that the Agent Orange lawsuit, filed two years earlier, had been settled. Prodded by U.S. District Judge Jack B. Weinstein, attorneys for the veterans and the chemical companies reached an agreement at 4 a.m. the morning the case was to go to trial. Despite the release earlier of the results of the Operation Ranch Hand study, 1984 seemed to be a year in which the Vietnam veteran's complaints about Agent Orange and the health problems it caused were being taken seriously. In late 1984, Congress passed Public Law 98-542, designed to provide compensation for soft tissue sarcoma and required the VA to establish standards for general Agent Orange and atomic radiation compensation. But every time a veteran went to the VA seeking compensation for Agent Orange related problems, he was turned away. "Since 1984, Public Law 98-542 has been virtually ignored," said South Dakota Sen. Tom Daschle. "In spite of the intent of Congress, in spite of the efforts of everyone involved in the writing of that law, in spite of our promises to veterans at that time that at long last, after all these years, they would be given the benefit of the doubt, not one veteran in this country has been compensated for any disease other than chloracne." Agent Orange sufferers tried on several occasions to sue the government for its role in use of the herbicide, but their suits were routinely dismissed because of what has come to be known as the Feres Doctrine. In 1950, the Supreme Court ruled in a case involving the death of a military man that the government is not responsible for deaths, injuries or other losses related to military service. TEST RESULTS CONTINUE TO BE MIXED Results of Agent Orange tests continued to be mixed. The results varied greatly, depending on who was doing the testing. In December, 1985, the Air Force released the third of its Operation Ranch Hand studies. Houk's CDC team complained throughout the study that those records were too spotty to make a scientific study of the effects of Agent Orange on soldiers. In addition, the Institute of Medicine, an arm of the National Academy of Sciences, had used outside consultants to study reports of troop deployment and Agent Orange spraying to determine if they were sufficient for CDC purposes. Its conclusion: the Pentagon had the necessary records. The Institute of Medicine also was highly critical of the CDC research methods, charging that it excluded from its study the veterans most likely to have been exposed to Agent Orange. WHITE HOUSE COVER-UP Despite information from three sources that there were adequate records available for a comprehen sive CDC study on Agent Orange, the White House and CDC sought to cover it up. First, the Institute of Medicine's study was never turned over to the White House. Then, Murray decided that as a non-scientist, he was in no position to challenge the objections of CDC's Houk and deferred to his judgement on the matter of records. Then, according to Daschle, the Pentagon came down hard on Christian for criticizing the CDC. "DOD officials altered his follow-up testimony before it was sent to the Hill, deleting his information challenging CDC's claims," said Daschle. By mid 1986, the White House had set the wheels in motion to cancel the CDC's Agent Orange study. There were other indications that the Reagan administration had no real interest in studies of Agent Orange or dioxin. In late 1986, the House Energy and Commerce Committee learned that the White House's Office of Management and Budget (OMB) was trying to stop all dioxin research, claiming that enough research had been done. Despite efforts to shut down research and cover up results of studies not favorable to the government or chemical companies, evidence continued to flow in showing a definite statistical link between cancers and exposure to Agent Orange and dioxin: -- A VA study released in 1987 showed that Marines who served in areas of Vietnam that had been heavily sprayed with Agent Orange had a 110 percent higher rate of non-Hodgkin's lymphomas. The study also showed these Marines had a 58 percent higher rate of lung cancers. STUDY CALLED A FRAUD But again, there was more information available that was never presented. The Institute of Medicine in the weeks before the CDC released its results of blood tests wrote a stinging rebuke of the CDC's tests methods. It said that none of the CDC's conclusions was supported by scientific data. The CDC refused to turn this report over to the White House. Other information began turning up that there were concerted efforts by various agencies of the government to conceal records and information about the effects of Agent Orange. Daschle learned that there were major discrepancies between a January 1984 draft of the Air Force's Operation Ranch Hand study and the February 1984 report. But these results were deleted from the final Ranch Hand Since this study was altered, Jenkins surmises, "It could be that other studies on exposed populations are similarly flawed and subject to fraud." This type fraud appears to have been perpetrated regularly in connection with Agent Orange research, yet Congress continues to rely on this flawed research when it considers legislation that would benefit the victims of Agent Orange and the other rainbow herbicides. MONTGOMERY HOLDS UP AGENT ORANGE LEGISLATION Efforts to get comprehensive Agent Orange legislation through Congress to right the wrongs of the cover-ups have been unsuccessful largely through the efforts of one man: Rep. Sonny Montgomery of Mississippi, chairman of the House Veterans Affairs Committee, who claimed to be the friend and champion of veterans in Congress - in fact had virtually single-handedly bottled up Agent Orange legislation. The CDC, meanwhile, continues to perpetrate the scientifically flawed myth that Agent Orange and dioxin posed no health threats to Vietnam veterans. BIZARRE FINDING One of the more bizarre aspects of this report from the CDC was the claim that those veterans who suffered most from non-Hodgkin's lymphoma had served on Navy ships off the coast of Vietnam. HOUSE COMMITTEE SAYS STUDY FLAWED According to the report, "The CDC study was changed from its original format so that it would have been unlikely for the soldiers who received the heaviest exposure to the herbicide to be identified. CDC accomplished this by unjustifiably discrediting the military records provided to it by the Department of Defense's Environmental Study Group (ESG)." POLITICS AND MONEY MORE IMPORTANT THAN HUMAN LIVES The rebuke of the White House and its Agent Orange Working Group (AOWG) was even more revealing of the manner in which Agent Orange studies have been manipulated by political and economic concerns, not concerns about human lives. "The original mandate to focus the White House panel on the effects of all herbicides was abruptly altered by the Reagan White House," according to the report. "By focusing the work of AOWG on Agent Orange only, the administration laid the groundwork for manipulating the study to the point of uselessness. "A possible reason that the White House chose this path is revealed in confidential documents prepared by attorneys in OMB. The White House was deeply concerned that the Federal Government would be placed in the position of paying compensation to veterans suffering diseases related to Agent Orange and, moreover, feared that providing help to Vietnam veterans would set the precedent of having the U.S. compensate civilian victims of toxic contaminant exposure, too." SOME DEFY CDC STUDY Despite the CDC's continuing recalcitrance on the issue of Agent Orange exposure, there have been other, more enlightened voices heard. Secretary of Veterans Affairs Edward Derwinski is one of them. After hearing of the CDC's latest study, he ordered the VA to pay compensation to all veterans suffering from non-Hodgkin's lymphoma, a ruling which could mean as much as $23 million to the 1,600 non-Hodgkin's lymphoma sufferers or their widows and children. Derwinski also decided not to challenge a California court's finding that the VA was applying too strict a standard to determine whether Agent Orange harmed Vietnam veterans. Derwinski ordered the VA to abide by legislation passed in 1984 to give veterans the benefit of the doubt on health claims. Another of the more enlightened voices is that of retired Adm. Elmo Zumwalt Jr., who ordered certain areas of Vietnam to be sprayed with Agent Orange. Zumwalt's son, Elmo Zumwalt III, served in the Navy in Vietnam and was exposed to the herbicide. Elmo Zumwalt III died in 1988 at the age of 42 from Hodgkin's diseases and lymphoma. Adm. Zumwalt has become a crusader on the issue of Agent Orange, charging that the government "intentionally manipulated or withheld compelling information on the adverse health effects" associated with exposure to Agent Orange. "The flawed scientific studies and manipulated conclusions are not only unduly denying justice to Vietnam veterans suffering from exposure to Agent Orange," said Zumwalt. GOVERNMENT PLAYS WAITING GAME But as the government continues to drag its feet, more veterans and their children continue to suffer the effects of Agent Orange. Time is on the side of the government. The longer it waits, the longer it procrastinates, the more the problems of Agent Orange exposure is diminished by the deaths of those who suffered from exposure to it. Their names could be added to the black granite wall of the Vietnam memorial, casualties of the rainbow herbicides that followed them home from the war. RAINBOW HERBICIDES AND THEIR COMPONENTS: - Agent Orange: 2,4-D and 2,4,5-T; used between January 1965 and April 1970. - Agent Orange II (Super Orange): 2,4-D and 2,4,5-T; used in 1968 and 1969. - Agent Purple: 2,4-D and 2,4,5-T; used between January 1962 and 1964. - Agent Pink: 2,4,5-T; used between 1962 and 1964. - Agent Green: 2,4,5-T; used between 1962 and 1964. - Agent White: Picloram and 2,4-D. - Agent Blue: contained cacodylic acid (arsenic). - Dinoxol: 2,4-D and 2,4,5-T; used between 1962 and 1964. - Trinoxol: 2,4,5-T; used between 1962 and 1964. - Diquat: Used between 1962 and 1964. - Bromacil: Used between 1962 and 1964. - Tandex: Used between 1962 and 1964. - Monuron: Used between 1962 and 1964. - Diuron: Used between 1962 and 1964. - Dalapon: Used between 1962 and 1964. [ Next Thread | Previous Thread | Next Message | Previous Message ] |
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