Author:
Wade A. Tisthammer
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Date Posted: 04/24/02 11:59am
In reply to:
Damoclese
's message, "Trying to keep my patience" on 04/18/02 7:06pm
>>>It doesn't make any sense to use a
>>>conditional about something that doesn't exist, just
>>>like it doesn't make any sense to use it on the
>>>Easter
>>>Bunny.
>>
>>It can indeed. Indirect proofs and reductio ad
>>absurdum are some usages of using conditional
>>statements of things that do not or cannot exist.
>
>
>There may be times in mathematics and other branches
>when this is true, but the existance of God is hardly
>theoretical mathematics.
Perhaps, but the existence of God (in this case) is part of symbolic logic, and indirect proofs are quite legitimate in symbolic logic (and there is no controversy in this).
>>>This argument assumes those primitive concepts
>>>exist,(at least as a logical possibility) whether or
>>>not you wish to admit it, and that really is the
>>>bottom line.
>>
>>They don’t have to assume that the concepts exist even
>>on a logical possibility. There is nothing in
>>definitions of conditional statements that imply that
>>at all. (Confer indirect proofs.)
>
>If they don't exist in the world as a logical
>possibility, then there really isn't any need to talk
>about them or address them with logic.
That’s not always true. Indirect proofs are one example, as is modus tollens. Even if you are correct, it is irrelevant to the problem since God (as defined for these purposes) is a logical possibility and this was explicitly stated in the second premise (~[]~G, which is the same as <>G). In any case, it is possible for a conditional to hold true even if the antecedent is false. Thus the truthfulness of the conditional does not imply the truth of the antecedent, much less presuppose it. Do you have any reason to think otherwise?
>Philosophers
>have often examined the application of a negative
>logical statement, and from what I've seen they've
>>It is functionally the same. Take the antecedent of
>>the statement: “If I get shot by death rays” logically
>>presupposes the “If death rays exist” conditional as
>>part of the statement. In any case, even if your
>>criticism were true it would not apply to the
>>one the ontological argumuent used, which is,
>>“If God exists, then…” It blatently includes
>>the condition that the statement holds true if
>>God exists.
>
>No, it isn't functionally the same, and if you think
>it is, you should try to slide it by a logic
>professor. If I get shot by death rays is a
>conditional that refers to whether or not one gets
>shot, the death rays are not in question. The only
>question is, will I or won't I get shot by death rays?
>If death rays exist is entirely different which calls
>into question death rays, but only attests to the
>affirmtive case, in other words, by using the words if
>death rays exist, one has committed themselves to an
>affirmitive conclusion of death rays exist, because
>otherwise a contradiction will be generated.
Not necessarily. “If I get shot by death rays, then death rays exist.” This is a true conditional, and so “If I get shot by death rays, then I will be dead,” also is correct. While both conditionals are true, neither affirm the antecedent, i.e. the truthfulness of the conditionals do not imply that death rays exist. In any case, it is irrelevant to the problem. The first premise starts out “If God exists…” so the conditional does not at all presuppose God’s existence. As I pointed out before, it is quite possible for G to be false and the conditional to be true.
>>The origins and motives of the statement don’t
>>matter. My motives could be utterly insane and it
>>wouldn’t change the statement’s truth-value. A monkey
>>could be the one who randomly typed up the statement
>>and it wouldn’t change the statement’s truth-value.
>>Remember, the premise only says “If God exists,
>>then he exists necessarily.” God not existing is not
>>in any way contradictory to the premise.
>
>Yes it is, you said so yourself when you realized that
>God not existing conflicted with the conditional of if
>he does, which you then threw out.
No, I never said that God not existing was contradictory to the first premise. I said that if we add the statement ~[]G (which, by the way, isn’t the same as ~G and thus doesn’t literally translate as “God doesn’t exist”) we get a contradiction because we get the statement “The greatest possible being cannot possibly exist.” If a being is possible (e.g. the greatest possible being) it can’t be impossible. The greatest possible being would by definition exist in at least one possible world. So the contradiction didn’t occur within the first premise. It happened elsewhere.
>>>Nor could you use the other to affirm God's
>>>existance,
>>
>>You could in conjunction with another premise, as I
>>have already proved. I did use a formal proof
>>to demonstrate this after all. Do you have any shred
>>of evidence whatsoever that the proof is unsound? If
>>not, I suggest you bow out of this discussion.
>
>Ahh, but Wade, the truth of your claim doesn't matter.
>You haven't proved anything besides that the argument
>with its presuppositions is logically consistant. You
>haven't proven the existance of God with this argument
>anymore than I could have proven the existance of the
>Easter Bunny with an if conditional.
God is proved if the first premises are true. I have given justification for their truthfulness. Why think that justification fails? And how can you possibly prove the existence of the Easter Bunny using the same sort of logical structure that the ontological argument used?
(Which brings us to the next section)
>>You could not prove statements like the existence of
>>the Easter Bunny because the premises just wouldn’t
>>hold true. The statement “If the Easter Bunny exists,
>>he exists necessarily” is not correct. Whereas some
>>claim that the two premises do hold true for
>>theism for reasons I have already explained.
>
>Wade, if you cannot see that my analogy with the
>Easter Bunny is exactly the same as your "proof" for
>God then I'm not going to hold your hand and show you
>each step of the way how both do the same job. All you
>would have to do is replace the words God with "easter
>bunny" throughout your entire proof, and presto, the
>easter bunny has been proven in traditional Wade style.
First, it’s not “my” style. I am not the one who formulated this argument of symbolic logic. Second, the Easter Bunny has not been proved for the same reason I explained earlier. The Easter Bunny ontological argument would be valid all right, but it would not be sound because the first premise would not be true. The statement “If the Easter Bunny exists, he exists necessarily” is not correct. Whereas some claim that the two premises do hold true for theism for reasons I have already explained.
>>On the contrary, there is a very good reason to do so.
>> The form of theism I’m referring to does
>>define God as the greatest possible being. Ask this
>>theist, “What are you referring to when you say,
>>‘God’? How do you define God? What exactly is
>>God?” and the theist would reply, “the greatest
>>possible being.” Here, God quite literally is
>>the greatest possible being. Note also that this
>>definition does not really point to any theistic
>>belief system in particular. There are many such
>>systems, not just Christianity, that contain a notion
>>of the greatest possible being. I’m not specifically
>>referring to the Christian God when discussing the
>>ontological argument I’ve told you about.
>
>There isn't any reason to assume that that brand of
>theism or any other that holds that God is the highest
>being is the correct way to view God.
That depends on how you define “God.” If “God” is defined in the way this ontological argument, then the defined version is correct. Out of curiosity, how do you define God?
>>>Let me break this down for you very clearly so as
>>>there isn't any more resulting confusion. Your proof
>>>doesn't matter to a hill of beans if there isn't a
>>>God. It doesn't matter how you define God initially,
>>>it doesn't matter if you used symbolic logic, it
>>>doesn't matter if you use propostional calculus, it
>>>doesn't matter if you issue five hundred postulates
>>>about what should follow if God exists. You can build
>>>intricate towers of logic about if this and this, but
>>>it doesn't matter if the base assumption is wrong. I
>>>question your first premise If God exists, just as you
>>>would question a premise If God doesn't exist.
>>>Something can be valid and it can still be "wrong" if
>>>the base assumptions are wrong.
>>
>>Evidently there is still confusion. The first premise
>>does not, repeat, Not, and to repeat
>>again, does NOT presuppose
>>the existence of God, and you have yet to provide any
>>shred of evidence to demonstrate otherwise. Yes, the
>>argument would be wrong if God doesn’t exist, just
>>like many scientists would be wrong if gravity doesn’t
>>exist. But scientists can only be wrong about gravity
>>if they have somehow misinterpreted the seemingly
>>overwhelming supporting evidence, and God can only
>>not exist if one of the two premises is wrong,
>>and you have yet to demonstrate that any of the two
>>premises are wrong.
>
>That's right. The If god exists part, he exists
>necessarily. If God doesn't exist, he doesn't exist
>necessarily. Take that logic line out, extend it, and
>I'll bet you find a conclusion that is contradictory
>to yours.
You would lose the bet. The statement “If God doesn’t exist, he doesn’t exist necessarily,” cannot be used in conjunction with the first premise to reach the conclusion of God not existing. If it can, I’d like to know how it can be done.
>>So if you think the proof is unsound, please explain
>>to me clearly what is wrong with the fist two
>>premises. For a recap, the first two premises
>>are:- If God exists, then he exists necessarily.
- It is possible for God to exist.
The purpose of the proof was to show that
>>the statement, “God necessarily exists” must be
>>true if the first two premises are true. And the
>>proof is quite valid (i.e. the conclusion must be true
>>if the premises are true). If you can’t give any
>>shred of evidence for doubting those two premises,
>>then I suggest you bow out.
>
>I'll bow out as soon as you admit (just once on this
>board) that not everyone on here that has objected to
>your post is confused, and that this argument does not
>prove the existance of God anymore than one for the
>Easter Bunny would. Judging from your past history, I
>have a feeling I'll be here for awhile.
And I’ll bow out as soon as you admit (just once on this board) that not everyone on here that has objected to your post is confused, and that this argument proves the existence of God even though it doesn’t do the same for the Easter Bunny. Judging from your past history, I have a feeling I’ll be here for a while.
In any case, I don’t see how the argument can prove the existence of the Easter Bunny given that the first premise is clearly flawed. I’ll admit that the ontological argument doesn’t work if you can similarly show that the first premise is flawed when applied to the definition of God I used. As for the first claim, David does not seem all that confused in regards to understanding the ontological argument.
Breaking it down and paraphrasing it (correct me if I have misunderstood you):
Damoclese—The first premise (“If God exists, then he necessarily exists) presupposes the existence of God. After all, why use the first premise if God doesn’t exist?
Wade’s reply—To believe that the first premise assumes the existence of God is to seriously confuse the nature of conditionals. The statement “If G, then []G” does not at all presuppose G. In fact, G can be false and it wouldn’t contradict the conditional. As for the question asked, the matter is irrelevant. It attacks the person holding the conditional to be true, not the actual conditional. A monkey could have randomly typed up the premise and it still wouldn’t change the truth value of the conditional.
Damoclese—Wade, you said so yourself that God not existing is contradictory to the first premise, when you realized that God not existing conflicted with the conditional if he doesn’t, which you then threw out.
Wade’s reply—No, I never said that God not existing was contradictory to the first premise. I said that if we add the statement ~[]G (which, by the way, isn’t the same as ~G and thus doesn’t literally translate as “God doesn’t exist”) we get a contradiction because we get the statement “The greatest possible being cannot possibly exist.” If a being is possible (e.g. the greatest possible being) it can’t be impossible. The greatest possible being would by definition exist in at least one possible world. So the contradiction didn’t occur within the first premise. It happened elsewhere.
Damoclese—The ontological argument you showed us can be used to “prove” the existence of the Easter Bunny. Therefore, the argument is flawed.
Wade’s reply—It doesn’t quite prove the Easter Bunny’s existence because the first premise doesn’t hold true with the Easter Bunny, whereas I have given arguments that attempt to explain why it holds true for God. So far, you have yet to even rebut them, and you have yet to give reasons for thinking that any of the first two premises are false.
Damoclese—If you take out the first premise (If G, then []G) and replace it with it’s complement (If ~G, then ~[]G) one can disprove the existence of God.
Wade’s reply—This is simply not true. One cannot use that premise in conjunction with the second to come up with ~G. If you believe it, I would like to see the proof demonstrating your point.
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