| Subject: I think I shall never see |
Author:
Damoclese
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Date Posted: 06/11/05 9:31am
In reply to:
Wade A. Tisthammer
's message, "Under the evidential tree" on 06/10/05 8:56pm
>
>And what nature reasonably can't. There are some
>things that nature cannot reasonably produce but
>humans (granted, the only known intelligent life) can.
Although we really aren't sure of what nature can and cannot produce since we've only been around for a smidgen of the time that nature has.
>
>Note by the way that we humans can already
>contrive functional proteins, RNA and DNA. It's not
>very disputable that someday we'll be able to do the
>same thing with life as well.
I think it's very premature to make such statements.
>
>To some extent, yes. If X had a beginning, and if the
>currents of nature are not reasonably capable of
>creating X,
Exactly how do you know what the "currents of nature" are capable of producing?
then appealing to artificial intervention
>is rational
Not if you don't know what nature is capable of producing...
even if it cannot have been human
>intervention and even if the designer has tastes that
>are radically different from our own.
Which would be fine except that 1) we don't know what the currents of nature can produce over especially long amounts of time and 2) We wouldn't be able to detect design if it wasn't like our own because we'd have no means of comparison.
>
>You need to be more specific. What assumption? That
>the design must be “sufficiently” human-like? If so,
>see above on what I said about that.
What you said above doesn't really help sweep that problem away. If anything it further complicates it because we don't know what nature is capable of producing especially given conditions that are nothing like the ones we know now.
>
>Background assumptions are implicitly made, but if the
>theory is wrong it can potentially show up in
>empirical testing.
Potentially, but if the assumpton is flawed enough from the beginning, it won't matter anyway.
>
>That's not what we ID adherents are saying. We
>are saying that if artificial intervention is
>necessary then we should expect things like (1)
>no known possible way to create life will ever be
>found (2) multiple serious barriers to the
>naturalistic formation of life will be found.
Which both happen to contain the assumptions I'm talking about above; especially number 1.
>
>Now, it’s possible that an alien designer could
>design something other than what ID says. But then
>such a theory would not be very empirically testable
>or falsifiable.
Since ID is not very specific about what is and what isn't designed and how we might go about testing that out, I'm not really all that surprised that the above is a problem.
So, ID assumes that the designer
>constructed life in such a way that naturalistic
>causes are insufficient in producing.
And how we detect that is a mystery.
You may not
>like that assumption, but it’s at least empirically
>testable and falsifiable.
It isn't until ID can outline some way in which we can say something was designed and also some way to show what nature can and cannot produce over long periods of time.
It’s certainly more
>falsifiable than abiogenesis (you may disagree, but
>then please come up with a conceivable laboratory
>experiment that would falsify abiogenesis).
Here's one: If the Miller experiment had shown that it wasn't possible to get proteins from inert matter, then abiogenesis would have been in grave trouble.
>
>But you also seem to be saying the
>"Well...let's all pretend these robots weren't
>designed" given the circumstances
No, if anything I'm saying that while design may be the explanation that one would lean towards one would be well advised NOT to go jumping to any conclusions since we can't know what nature can and cannot produce especially on other planets and since we've only experienced things of our own design.
>
>An animal's explosive diarrhea does not seem like a
>plausible explanation for creating robots.
>Intelligent design appears to be much more reasonable.
If you mean it seems to make intuitively more sense to you, then fine. However, that doesn't make it more reasonable.
>
>Not at all. If an alien designed something that
>naturalistic causes are not reasonably capable of
>doing,
Which we would know how?
it would still be rational to accept design.
>What species the intelligent agent is has no relevance.
It's quite relevant since we only know of our own designs.
>
>In short, the basic reasoning of ID has nothing to do
>about the designer being sufficiently close to humans.
Oh no? Then how is it we are to detect design? By the currents of nature? We don't have any clue about the currents of nature on other planets and don't have much of a clue about the currents of nature on our own planet.
> It has to do with examining the capabilities of
>nature (arguing from known chemistry and mathematical
>probability etc.).
Although we don't really know what the capabilities of nature are.
>
>Well, my point was that these scientists were
>not emulating how abiogenesis could have
>supposedly produced them (which was quite pertinent
>given what I was responding to).
Abiogensis probably didn't use machines to generate the given outcome, but it could have very well used the basic concepts in some other way. I noticed you didn't answer my question about there being only one possible way to make proteins, so I'll ask again: Do you really think there is only ONE way to make proteins?
ID has a known
>possible mechanism (for functional proteins, RNA and
>DNA etc.), abiogenesis does not.
Having a known possible mechanism isn't a big help when one of your major assumptions is wobbly.
>
>Again, ID is arguing from what we do know about
>observed chemistry, mathematical probability etc.
Actually, it isn't. It's arguing from what abiogensis DOESN'T know. Then, it begins to argue from some things that we DO know while relying on some things that we can't know yet to produce a conclusion that is supposedly theoretically knowable.
>
>Having a known mechanism to work with is better than
>not having one.
Not really, particularly not when the mechanism you have is rather unlikely due to complication.
Think of a criminal trial. The
>accused must have a means to commit the crime.
>If one suspect has a known means and opportunity but
>the other does not, the former suspect looks more
>promising (all else held constant).
If one has a known means but not really much of an opportunity, neither of them look very promising.
>
>What assumption? That the designer necessarily has
>humanoid characteristics? If so, the idea that there
>exists this flawed assumption is itself flawed as I
>explained earlier.
But as you can see from this post, you really didn't explain it. You just hid behind carefully worded ID assumptions that mask the same problem.
>By all means, please give me some shred of evidence
>that I am "clearly" wrong.
If I give you direct evidence by observation (empirical evidence) that people do not believe things are rational which do not happen, you reject it and demand a "shred of evidence". I'm afraid I can't do much better than empirical evidence.
>
>That's not enough. People don't always behave
>rationally, so pointing out that some people don't
>always believe X even if X is highly probably true is
>not a good argument.
I'm not pointing out that they don't always believe X. I'm pointing out that if something other than X happens, if they don't then accept that other X, then they aren't being rational.
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