| Subject: My reply |
Author:
Damoclese
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Date Posted: 12/16/02 1:58pm
In reply to:
Wade A. Tisthammer
's message, "My question." on 12/15/02 11:11pm
>
>
>>I do however, in the world of experience think that in
>>order to engauge in conversations about morality, one
>>most postulate that morality exists to begin with,
>>though it may well be the case that it doesn't.
>
>Not necessarily. A noncognitivist can easily become a
>part of conversations about morality. I myself am a
>witness to this event.
The problem is that if one engauges in a debate with one who doesn't postulate the existance of morality, then there really isn't a debate to begin with. It becomes more a contest of sophist justifications for particular actions.
>
>
>>Hence, the golden rule to me in the world of
>>experience is to do the least harm for the most
>>people. It isn't okay to kill an infant to the
>>pleasure of the masses because the masses aren't going
>>to be as harmed as the killing of the infant.
>
>This sounds like “least pain” rather than “greatest
>happiness.” An interesting twist on utilitarianism.
>What part, if any, does pleasure take part in this?
Pleasure is good as long as the pleasure acquired doesn't inflict harm. It isn't an epicurean notion of "get all the pleasure you can" but more of take the pleasure you can get without violating the harm rule.
>
>>If the situation were to kill an
>>infant or to let everyone else die, then the infant
>>could be killed, and the principle wouldn't be
>>violated.
>
>Hmm, how about this hypothetical case. Suppose
>killing an innocent person would decrease the overall
>pain in the world by forever preventing a multitude of
>people from having the non-lethal flu. What does your
>ethical philosophy say about this?
I would say the denial of that person's will to live and the harm inflicted both on that person and that person's family by their death is a far greater harm than people having to suffer from the flu. I say this mostly because if many people get the flu, they feel bad but then they can carry on with life without the colaterial damage done by someone's death which is final and inflicts far greater suffering than any annoying flu.
>
>As you might guess, the main beef I have about
>utilitarian ethics is that it often fails to
>sufficiently take into account the concept of justice,
>a concept which I believe is fundamental to a sound
>metaethical theory.
That depends on what one considers justice. Justic often takes the form of revenge. It often is the case that because someone hurt someone else, the other person feels the need to hurt them back. I'm not saying this is a wrong feeling, but it doesn't much sound like justice to me. I'd be interested to know what it is you consider just and why.
Damoclese
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