| Subject: Both offered. Slick too busy. CIA crippled, thanks to Bob Torricelli. |
Author:
Typical libs.
|
[
Next Thread |
Previous Thread |
Next Message |
Previous Message
]
Date Posted: 13:00:13 06/29/02 Sat
Author Host/IP: 216.40.249.58
In reply to:
The Veeckster
's message, "Uh, are you talking about the SUDAN offer? LOL." on 12:14:21 06/29/02 Sat
Ignorant libs have never heard of the "Torricelli Principle."
Dumbass libs. No wonder they couldn't vote.
>(I know, all those funny S countries tend to run
>together...)
>
>OK Kenny. These are the actual FACTS about that
>episode.
>
>Cheers!
>
>Diplomacy and Politics
>A Growing Effort Against bin Laden
>
>
>As Mr. Clinton prepared his re-election bid in 1996,
>the administration made several crucial decisions.
>Recognizing the growing significance of Mr. bin Laden,
>the C.I.A. created a virtual station, code-named Alex,
>to track his activities around the world.
>
>In the Middle East, American diplomats pressed the
>hard-line Islamic regime of Sudan to expel Mr. bin
>Laden, even if that pushed him back into Afghanistan.
>
>To build support for this effort among Middle Eastern
>governments, the State Department circulated a dossier
>that accused Mr. bin Laden of financing radical
>Islamic causes around the world.
>
>The document implicated him in several attacks on
>Americans, including the 1992 bombing of a hotel in
>Aden, Yemen, where American troops had stayed on their
>way to Somalia. It also said Mr. bin Laden's
>associates had trained the Somalis who killed 18
>American servicemen in Mogadishu in 1993.
>
>Sudanese officials met with their C.I.A. and State
>Department counterparts and signaled that they might
>turn Mr. bin Laden over to another country. Saudi
>Arabia and Egypt were possibilities.
>
>State Department and C.I.A. officials urged both Egypt
>and Saudi Arabia to accept him, according to former
>Clinton officials. ''But both were afraid of the
>domestic reaction and refused,'' one recalled.
>
>Critics of the administration's effort said this was
>an early missed opportunity to destroy Al Qaeda. Mr.
>Clinton himself would have had to lean hard on the
>Saudi and Egyptian governments. The White House
>believed no amount of pressure would change the
>outcome, and Mr. Clinton risked spending valuable
>capital on a losing cause. ''We were not about to have
>the president make a call and be told no,'' one
>official explained.
>
>Sudan obliquely hinted that it might turn Mr. bin
>Laden over to the United States, a former official
>said. But the Justice Department reviewed the case and
>concluded in the spring of 1996 that it did not have
>enough evidence to charge him with the attacks on
>American troops in Yemen and Somalia.
>
>In May 1996, Sudan expelled Mr. bin Laden,
>confiscating some of his substantial fortune. He moved
>his organization to Afghanistan, just as an obscure
>group known as the Taliban was taking control of the
>country.
>
>Clinton administration officials counted it as a
>positive step. Mr. bin Laden was on the run, deprived
>of the tacit state sponsorship he had enjoyed in
>Sudan.
>
>''He lost his base and momentum,'' said Samuel R.
>Berger, Mr. Clinton's national security adviser in his
>second term.
>
>In July 1996, shortly after Mr. bin Laden left Sudan,
>Mr. Clinton met at the White House with Dick Morris,
>his political adviser, to hone themes for his
>re-election campaign.
[
Next Thread |
Previous Thread |
Next Message |
Previous Message
]
| |
Feedback: 