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呢篇好長, 請比d心機慢慢睇... - Son
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Date Posted: 15:23:35 06/19/02 Wed
It is becoming increasingly clear that Marcelo Bielsa has no shame.
There is no doubt whatsoever that Bielsa's tactical blunders were to blame for Argentina's failure. By his own admission this is the case, but at the same time he has shifted part of the blame onto his players by bemoaning the '15 missed chances' and claiming that his team was the best side in the group. He was also quick to point to the positive aspects of his tenure – which can only be a reference to the team's performance in the qualifying rounds. A lawyer by training, he obviously still knows how to mitigate.
A moment's thought reveals the man's claims as both untrue and reeking of cowardice.
The facts are very simple. Bielsa's brainchild, the 3-3-1-3 formation, was heralded as a success after Argentina topped the South American qualifying group. There are three reasons for their success. Firstly, the ultra attacking formation was ideal for hammering the weaker teams at the bottom of the group to obtain maximum points. Secondly, the other teams couldn't match Argentina's depth of squad over a very long and arduous campaign in which each team had to play 18 games. Thirdly, the other teams were very poor indeed, with the exception of Brazil. Uruguay and Ecuador both failed to make the last 16, while Paraguay made heavy weather of qualifying from the relatively easy group B. Thankfully the Paraguayans are out after their pitiful display against Germany, leaving Brazil as South America's last representative.
A glance at Argentina's qualification record shows it to be far less awesome than it appears. Their ability to produce crushing wins against minnows bagged them plenty of goals and points, but their performances against genuine contenders were far less impressive. Their best result was probably in beating Ecuador twice. Two draws against Paraguay, a win and a draw against Uruguay, and a win and a loss to Brazil are, in retrospect, unremarkable. Furthermore, had it been a cup tie, the Brazilians would have beaten Argentina on goal difference (4-3 on aggregate.)
Once the World Cup finals started, the gloss came off Argentina's reputation quickly after Spain played badly but still beat Paraguay 3-1. Ecuador turned out to be mere cannon fodder in group G, and only Thierry Henry's dismissal saved Uruguay from being labeled with the same tag. With the exception of Brazil and Argentina, all the South American teams were weak in midfield. Star players like Alvaro Recoba, Nelson Cuevas and Roque Santa Cruz worked hard to put the icing on what proved to be a very stale cake indeed. Had it not been for their efforts, their countries would have been disgraced as everyone else in their teams looked utterly devoid of both ideas and technique.
Bielsa's claims regarding his team's bad luck are nothing more than obfuscation. He complains about missed opportunities, yet it was his idea to field the players who failed to convert them. Batistuta's lack of pace betrayed his age, nonetheless Bielsa selected him instead of Crespo. If this risky move had worked the coach would have been praised for his tactical insight, so it's hardly unfair to blame him for getting it wrong. It was also Bielsa's plan to field Kily Gonzalez as a striker when his normal habitat is midfield. This misuse of a good player's talents would also have been hailed as a tactical masterstroke if it had worked. The fact that it didn't is an indictment in itself: after all, it's the coach's job to know his players' strengths, weaknesses and capabilities. Claudio Lopez spent the tournament crossing poorly and failed to get a single shot on target. In his defence, it should be pointed out that he's a counter-attacking striker who was asked by Bielsa to play on the flank and help Argentina hold the ball and dominate possession.
As the creator of Argentina's formation, Bielsa more than anyone should have been aware of the immense pressure it placed on the playmaker to provide the 3 strikers with ammunition. In countless interviews Bielsa had praised Veron, calling him the most important player in the side and making it clear the man had his full confidence. In several Premier League matches Veron's ability to cope in tight spaces had been called into question. The result had been embarassment, with Veron either becoming a peripheral figure or giving the ball away. Although many considered Riquelme a better choice for this difficult, high pressure role, Bielsa believed in his man. If he had doubted his playmaker's ability, he would have made a tactical reshuffle to a 3-5-2 or replaced Veron from the start with Marcelo Gallardo. Even basic commonsense would have suggested that Sven Goran Eriksson, Veron's former coach, might know a thing or two about his weak points. After twenty minutes against England, one thing was clear: if the playmaker was shut down, Argentina's three strikers were virtually snuffed out. In four years, Bielsa had apparently never considered this point.
Likewise, it did not occur to Bielsa that England's single-minded attacking strategy of feeding Owen with crossfield passes could be hampered substantially by instructing his three holding midfielders to use a zonal marking system to prevent the passes from reaching him. At any given time, only one of Sorin, Simeone and Zanetti had to be on hand to track Owen and prevent the pass from being played to him directly. If the pass had been played into space in front of him, Argentina's excellent defenders could have cut it out. Everyone knows that Owen's strength is his pace and ability to run onto passes rather than his skill at heading in crosses, which is a relatively weak point. Consequently, England played the crossfield pass at every opportunity. Bielsa's brilliant ostrich strategy consisted of burying his head in the sand and trusting in his defenders' ability to weather the storm. Owen spent the first 40 minutes wreaking havoc with Bielsa's blessing and Pochettino cracked under pressure to concede the penalty.
The fact is that after England scored Argentina still had 45 minutes to salvage disaster and equalise. It's not as if they were cheated of a draw by a goal in the final minute. Bielsa's response – substituting Pablo Aimar for Veron - was typical. Veron's disastrous performance meant that he had to be replaced. Given the importance of the match, the logical replacement would have been Ortega or Gallardo. Both players were 26 and had the experience and skill to replace Veron. This would have allowed Argentina to field Aimar as a striker, where his pace and dribbling skills could have proved their most effective weapon against the resolute English defence, who had no difficulty containing Batistuta. Aimar is an outstanding talent, but it was harsh to place so heavy a responsibility on a 22 year old. Players of that age are known for cracking under pressure: Maradona (1982) Beckham (1998) and Ortega (1998) are three examples that spring to mind. If Aimar had lost his cool and been sent off, Bielsa would no doubt have exonerated himself on the grounds that you can't turn a deficit around with ten men.
Bielsa complained that 'the other sides played defensively.' The question is, given Argentina's policy of non-stop, relentless attacking, what else did he expect of their opposition? His stated aim was to play as much of the game as possible in the opposition's half, and his team followed his instructions to the letter. England did the sensible thing and packed the box with men. Bielsa's second-half tactics amounted to crossing his fingers and trying to outnumber the opposition in the penalty area.
Argentina's strikers were crowded out by the English defenders, who had little difficulty marking Batistuta and Ortega. At any given moment, they always knew where Batistuta would be – about half a metre from Rio Ferdinand. They did not have to move to mark the Argentines. Their attention was never divided by the need to track a midfielder's late run into the box to meet a cross, because all of them were there already. Bielsa could have instructed his men to make low, short cutbacks along the ground to players on either side of the goal, who could then have peppered the English goal with angled shots. The wingers could have dribbled into the box from the flank to force the defenders to make difficult, high pressure tackles that could easily have won a penalty. Instead Bielsa played to his opponents' strengths, expecting them to make a mistake in the air. Seaman easily caught the inswinging crosses, which were too close to goal, and the other ten men calmly cleared the outswingers. In the last ten minutes Argentina surrounded the English and attacked them from every angle in their best spell of the match, but it proved to be too late.
Against Sweden, Bielsa had a full 90 minutes to produce a victory in admittedly difficult circumstances. It's true that Sweden were lucky to score in a match where they had few chances. But Argentina's domination failed to create more than a few clear-cut scoring opportunities. Possession statistics don't tell the story of a match: Denmark had 61% of the possession against England but did nothing useful with the ball all day as they lost 3-0. Fielding Claudio Lopez was a mistake. Likewise, Batistuta failed to produce even a single moment to justify his selection over Hernan Crespo. By the time Crespo came on his team were chasing a lost cause again as Svensson blasted his free kick home. Argentina's strikers were starved of opportunities as Bielsa's restrictive game plan left them no opportunity to move away from the central defenders marking them. They followed orders, stuck to their positions and, consequently, might as well have handcuffed themselves to their markers. It seems that Bielsa regards concepts such as 'off the ball movement' and 'elusive' as anathema.
In the 88th minute Argentina finally levelled the scoreline but it's untrue to claim they deserved the win. If proof of Sweden's vulnerability is needed, Senegal have just provided it. Like Argentina, they went behind to a Swedish set-piece. Their response was to tear Sweden apart with economy, creating a host of chances with two or three attackers probing for weaknesses while the rest of the team sat back to keep the game safe. They equalised before half-time and won the match after looking dangerous throughout. Bielsa's men pushed forward in numbers but barely created a single clear cut chance. It's obvious that they were deployed inefficiently – ironic given Bielsa's commitment to European style tactical sophistication.
It was entirely the coach's decision to field a 3-3-1-3. Let's not forget that he had four years to select the players best suited to implement it. In fairness to Bielsa, it has to be said that he was right to omit Saviola, who has tremendous talent but is still far from being the solution to Argentina's lack of firepower in tough matches. But Riquelme should have been taken to the World Cup as cover for Veron. Gallardo was never used, even when Veron ran into trouble, which raises the question of why Bielsa even bothered to bring him along in the first place. Riquelme's close control, ability to slip passes through tight gaps, and dribbling skills made him the perfect candidate for the playmaker's role, particularly in the match against England. At 24, he's about the right age, too. Explosive pace isn't a feature of his game, but with Argentina's strikers virtually camped in the penalty area, there was no need for speed on the playmaker's part anyway. With Riquelme in the team, Argentina would have had a far tougher and more enterprising option than Veron. Then, Bielsa could have switched to a 3-4-1-2, with greater emphasis on solidity and late runs from midfielders to arrive in the box unmarked. The two strikers would have been able to slip between the defenders, instead of standing next to them and waiting for mistakes which never came. Moreover, if Aimar had been played further forward his pace and ability to take defenders on might have led to a penalty or a goal.
A coach like Bilardo or Carlos Bianchi would have emphasised the importance of solidity and fielded a more defensive formation. But, knowing the team had a rock solid foundation, they would also have allowed the creative players the space and freedom to express themselves without fear, knowing that a mistake with a pass or run wouldn't lead to disaster. The pattern of play would have been less predictable. And the team would probably have been twice as effective.
Certainly, Argentina had the deepest and most talented squad in the tournament. Bielsa's claim that his team was the best side is therefore quite correct. However it's precisely this fact which makes his errors all the less defensible.
Having flopped at this World Cup, it's rumoured that the Argentine FA are about to inflict more pain on themselves by extending Bielsa's contract for another four years. At the next World Cup the opposition will be tougher, the conditions less favourable (ie Europe) and the Argentine squad somewhat weaker. They have outstanding talents coming up but they are also bidding farewell to a host of great names who are either retiring or will be past their best by 2006.
If Bielsa's bizarre system failed when everything was going Argentina's way, how can it hope to work when the difficulties will be so much greater? More concerning still is the man's poor player selection and lack of tactical understanding. His rigid policy of "what's good enough for Europe is good enough for me" left him without cover for the single most important player in the team – the playmaker. Gallardo's exclusion from the line-up is inexplicable given his apparent position in the squad. An unkind interpretation is that, when it came to the crunch, Bielsa didn't trust his own judgement. Having brought Gallardo as cover for Veron, he didn't know his man well enough to decide whether he was capable of filling the position. So he took the easy way out and handed the job to Aimar, giving himself an escape route in the process.
The Argentine FA's stance is incomprehensible when a coach of Carlos Bianchi's calibre is waiting in the wings. Bianchi has won the Intercontinental Cup twice, beating Real Madrid and AC Milan when both teams were at the peak of their powers. His record is exceptional, including the Copa Libertadores and Argentine league titles. He has also been instrumental in guiding the developments of young talents like Riquelme.
How ironic that Argentina, of all countries, have forgotten that old Spanish curse. "May your life be full of lawyers."
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