| Subject: Foxes |
Author:
Damoclese
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Date Posted: 04/26/02 12:19pm
In reply to:
Wade A. Tisthammer
's message, "What's the chase?" on 04/26/02 11:05am
>Your browser seems to have turn all my apostrophes and
>smart quotes into question marks from the previous
>post. Because you couldn?t read the symbols I used
>(which were standard html and showed up on my browser)
>try getting the most recent version of Internet
>Explorer (it?s free) at
rel=nofollow target=_blank >href="http://www.microsoft.com/windows/ie/downloads/ie6
>/default.asp">this web page. Also, try going to
>View on the web browser menu, select
>Encoding and be sure it?s set to Western
>European (Windows).
Under windows I was using explorer six, which seems to have a different character map (I'm guessing) than the code you used. I'm using mozilla now under linux, and I can see your quotes (and symbols) however when I post back it minces them.
>
>
>Well, then what is this concept that you claim
>has no force behind it? It the concept of a being
>that is omnipotence, omniscience, etc. to the greatest
>possible extent? If so, then it fits the definition
>of God I described above. God is defined in here as
>?the greatest possible being,? and is thus maximal
>perfection (to the extent that is possible). How much
>power does a perfect being have? Perfect power.
>Omnipotence (to the greatest possible extent). How
>much knowledge? Perfect knowledge. Omniscience (to
>the greatest possible extent) etc.
Defining God in my opinion if such a thing exists as all powerful and the like is completely useless because it places God outside logic and outside the realm of limiting defintions. I personally object to the Christian definition of God because I'm fairly certain such a being doesn't exist.
Note however that that doesn't mean that I don't think something might exist in such a fashion as to be considered a God by human standards. (even something as lowly as an angel in christian jargon would be god-like to a human) If such a thing exists, I don't know, and personally think it is impossible to ever intellectually know as a certainty.
>First you?d have to show me the system that you claim
>exists. I don?t think any sound argument of that sort
>exists anywhere. If it does, please show it to me.
>Furthermore, you talked about ?shift the base the
>assumption.? What are these ?base assumption?s?
>(both in the argument I presented and in your alleged
>argument that makes a different conclusion). What
>would the base assumptions be?
The base assumption you made in your original post was this: "The greatest possible being would by definition have the greatest possible existence: necessary existence."
First of all, this immediately raises the question "Is there even a greatest possible being to begin with?" Necessary existence seems to me to also be a bit of a jump that needs more defining...
However, let's change our base assumption to this:
There is no greatest possible being, and by defintion it (the being) has no existance: necessary non-existance. I suppose if we wanted, we could then proceed to make a symbolic argument for the rest, but I prefer not to because it takes up time I don't have, and I really couldn't care less what symbolic logic would show in this arena because my underlying assumption is itself in question, just as yours is.
>
>It depends on the specific disagreement. You for
>instance seriously confuse the nature of conditionals
>if you think that the first premise presupposes the
>existence of God. Sometimes misunderstandings happen,
>particularly in very controversial topics. I do not
>claim that all disagreements are based on confusions,
>though occasionally that is indeed the case. When did
>I ever accuse Brian or Ben of confusing my points in
>this thread? Did Brian even enter in on the subject?
Not in this thread, but elsewhere on the board. (more on my disagreement with conditionals later).
>
>
>>
>>That's sort of right. The he necessarily exists part
>>is the only way to go if you use the If, as I pointed
>>out above. I object to that, in the same way I would
>>object to If god doesn't exist, then he (insert
>>whatever claim here providing it doesn't conflict with
>>non-existance) and the reason I object to that is
>>because it cannot account for existance in this case.
>
>It is true that the first premise by itself does not
>imply God?s existence. But so what? That premise (by
>itself) wasn?t supposed to.
That's not what I'm saying. I'm saying you've limited yourself on the first premise to some phrase that either explicitly or implicitly assumes God exists. Again, you cannot say If God exists, then he doesn't exist. Let me go back to my rain example... If it rains outside I will take an umbrella. The second part of my sentence assumes that it is raining implicitly, otherwise why would I take an umbrella? Once I say If it rains I've committed myself to that condition alone, and no more.
>>
>>It would if you said If A not A. Let's code your
>>argument in the way I understand it. G=God E=exists
>>N=necessarily.
>>
>>If G E, Then G E N.
>>
>>As you can see, you could not logically have this
>>statement If G E, Then not G E N which is a
>>possibility. (god not existing is a possibility)
>
>I?m not sure what relevance this has to anything. I
>did not use that conditional.
Yes you did. This is from the post "Thank You." "If God (on the definition above) exists, He exists necessarily."
And since you did use that conditional, you cannot logically say my above phrase, else you will contradict your conditional.You cannot account for the other possiblity of God's non-existance with your argument.
>
>The conclusion ?[]G? is not a conditional except in
>the sense that if the first two premises are true (?If
>G then []G? and ?<>G?) then the conclusion is true.
>I?ve given arguments supporting the veracity of those
>premises. You have yet to even really attack any of
>the premise?s veracity.
I've given you several reasons why I don't agree with them: first the underlying theistic assumptions about God's existance. Next, defining a being outside the realm of logic. Lastly, using a conditional that can only account for one possibility namely God existing, and not treating the other possibility realistically.
By the way, I found it somewhat ironic that you said your conclusion isn't conditional except that if that first two premises are true. I think that would make it conditional don't you?
>>
>>But we don't even know that God is "possible" anymore
>>than say the Easter Bunny.
>
>Of course we do. God is defined as the
>greatest possible being. Given this coherent
>meaning, it hardly makes any logical sense to say that
>the greatest possible being cannot possibly exist.
Okay, fine, but why not define the Easter Bunny as the same? Or leprechauns, or Allah, or how about Krishna, or Puff the Magic Dragon or Janet Reno? My point is you can define any of these the same way, and your proof will work equally as well.
There isn't a logical reason to define God as the greatest possible being. I think the only thing we are permitted to say if anything in that realm is that God is greater than humans.
>
>Not in the sense I was referring to. For example, it
>is possible that there Julius Caesar never existed and
>that all documents pointing to his existence were
>forged a long time ago. This is possible, however
>unlikely it may seem, particularly since it doesn?t
>contradict any principles of logic. On the other
>hand, me existing and not existing at the same time
>not logically impossible because of its
>self-contradictory nature. So it?s not true that any
>untrue claim is possible.
Contradictions are a tricky lot, and I'm not sure we are permitted to categorically say they are untrue when they are generated. We throw them out because they doesn't make sense. For example in the same instant on the planet earth with light striking the same point it is possible for it to be both one o'clock and two o'clock. It is also possible for someone using sign language to be talking, and yet not talking. We can make cases to place each of these happenings in one category or another, but really they don't fit neatly into any particular place. When we encounter them we tend to broaden our defintions so that we sacrifice definiability for greater application of a more general defintion.
Back to Goedel, what do you do when the tried and true system proves that there isn't a proof for this statement? Throw it out? Re-do the system? Or ignore it?
>
>I think you need to clarify what you said here. What
>conditional I applied at the very end of the argument
>are you talking about? I did not have any
>conditional anywhere in the argument for any statement
>(call it p) where I said, ?If <>p, then??
I was talking about the way it was presented in the last post, but it is the same criticism as my above if criticism anyway.
>>
>>It did in the sense that if I say God exists, and
>>later my argument says "god doesn't exist" I've made a
>>completely useless argument.
>
>Not at all! (If I am understanding you correctly.)
>If you did that you would have just provided an
>indirect proof for the nonexistence of God (provided
>that the premises are true).
My point is that the If God exists line is useless. I might as well have not placed it there to begin with.
>
>>It's just the same as
>>saying If it rains, it isn't raining.
>
>You seem to be seriously confusing the nature of the
>first premise. The conclusion of the modified
>argument didn?t read, ?If God exists, then he doesn?t
>exist.? Rather, the modified argument that I was
>referring to argues that given these two premises:
>
>- If God exists, then he necessarily exists.
> - It is possible for God not to exist.
>
>Conclusion: God necessarily does not exist.
I know it didn't. I'm saying that by using that conditional, you cannot say "If God exists, he doesn't exist". You can't run across "he doesn't exist" anywhere if you want your "If God exists" to be of any use.
>
>On the other hand, let?s take a look at what the
>ontological argument I?ve brought forth says:
>
>- If God exists, he exists necessarily.
> - It is possible for God to exist.
>
>Conclusion: God necessarily exists.
>
>The argument says that if the first two premises are
>correct, then God must exist. The conclusion is
>not, ?If God exists, then he exists
>necessarily.? That was a premise, not the conclusion.
> Rather, it says that if the first two premises are
>correct, then the conclusion must be correct also.
>Only those two premises are needed to arrive at
>the conclusion (in conjunction with the principles of
>logic), and neither of the two premises
>presupposes God?s existence. Furthermore, there was
>no, ?God exists? statement to put into premise #1 to
>arrive at a modus ponens proof. You have yet
>to show any either of the two premises presupposes
>God?s existence.
I said they commit to the affirmitive case of God's existance, and because they do this, they presuppose God's existance.
>
>Let me try to clear this up again. All the first
>premise says is, ?If God exists, then he necessarily
>exists,? or ?If G then []G.? The conditional as two
>parts: the antecedent (the ?G?) and the
>consequent (the ?[]G?). The first premise is, ?If God
>exists, then he exists necessarily.?
Yes, and here is where I begin to disagree with the way this thing is formulated. The way your conditonal runs you cannot say If God exists, he doesn't exist. You cannot say If god doesn't exist, he exists necessarily. The only possible combination for you to use is that If God exists, he exists necessarily. Wonder what would happen if I used the negative case? Let's see... "If god doesn't exist, he doesn't exist necessarily"... "If god doesn't exist, he exists necessarily" "If god exists, he doesn't exist neccessarily." Hmmm. Looks like the negative case only has one possible combination that will work too. Seems that if I use one or the other I committ to either the positive or negative case.
It is
>not ?If God exists, then the premises below
>would be true.? Rather, the consequent is far more
>limited: []G. ?If G, then []G.? This premise is not
>in any way inconsistent with ~G. The first premise is
>simply ?If G, then []G.? That?s it. If that first
>premise is true, and if <>G is true, then []G is true.
> That?s exactly what I?m saying, and I?m right as I
>proved using the formal proof. The only way to avoid
>[]G is to doubt at least one of the premises.
and I did, particularly the initial presumption.
>
>The first premise does allow for the
>nonexistence. ?If G, then []G? does not in any
>logical way contradict ?~G,? nor does ?~G? contradict
><>G in any logical way. Recall that I made a modified
>form of the argument that did include an ?If
>God doesn?t exist, then?? statement and the same
>conclusion was still reached.
See the above for why it does commit you to at least the positive case which in turn causes your contradiction to come up later.
>>
>>The reason's you've given are that "some people
>>believe it."
>
>No, that?s not the reason I?ve given. The
>justification that has been given is that the greatest
>possible being would by definition have the greatest
>possible form of existence: necessary existence.
Why is that? Do you have a particular reason for this?
But
>there is nothing inherent in the concept of the Easter
>Bunny that makes the statement, ?If the Easter Bunny
>exists, then he exists necessarily,? true.
Why not?
>I suppose it?s possible that one can use that premise
>in conjunction with some other premises to get a
>conclusion of God not existing, but it would only work
>if the argument were both valid (the conclusion
>logically follows from the premises) and sound
>(validity + all the premises, not just the first one,
>are true). I don?t think any such argument exists.
>If it does, please show it to me.
I think it would be quite possible as I said above to take my assumption and build some sort of symbolical framework to make the argument. I haven't seen one around, but I haven't really been looking for one because it wouldn't really matter if the argument existed or not. The fact of the matter is, it's equally possible that God exists, or doesn't. If an argument doesn't treat that fact that way, then it isn't really addressing the issue.
Damoclese
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