Author:
Wade A. Tisthammer
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Date Posted: 04/26/02 11:05am
In reply to:
Damoclese
's message, "Cutting to the chase" on 04/24/02 2:22pm
Your browser seems to have turn all my apostrophes and smart quotes into question marks from the previous post. Because you couldn’t read the symbols I used (which were standard html and showed up on my browser) try getting the most recent version of Internet Explorer (it’s free) at this web page. Also, try going to View on the web browser menu, select Encoding and be sure it’s set to Western European (Windows).
I’ll attempt to get down to the basics a little more, since it seems that you repeat your points, particularly on your apparent confusion of the first premise.
>>That depends on how you define “God.” If “God” is
>>defined in the way this ontological argument, then the
>>defined version is correct. Out of curiosity, how do
>>you define God?
>
>I define God as a concept, particularly a concept with
>no force behind it.
Well, then what is this concept that you claim has no force behind it? It the concept of a being that is omnipotence, omniscience, etc. to the greatest possible extent? If so, then it fits the definition of God I described above. God is defined in here as “the greatest possible being,” and is thus maximal perfection (to the extent that is possible). How much power does a perfect being have? Perfect power. Omnipotence (to the greatest possible extent). How much knowledge? Perfect knowledge. Omniscience (to the greatest possible extent) etc.
>>You would lose the bet. The statement “If God doesn’t
>>exist, he doesn’t exist necessarily,” cannot be used
>>in conjunction with the first premise to reach the
>>conclusion of God not existing. If it can, I’d like
>>to know how it can be done.
>
>I didn't say that it could be directly substituted
>into the framework your argument rests in. I said (or
>at least meant) one could if they were so inclined,
>shift the base assumption around and then build an
>entirely different symbolic argument using perhaps the
>same rules or modulations of them, and come out with
>an argument to the contrary. So then, I'd ask you,
>which of you would be right? You've both used the same
>system, and come out with different answers?
First you’d have to show me the system that you claim exists. I don’t think any sound argument of that sort exists anywhere. If it does, please show it to me. Furthermore, you talked about “shift the base the assumption.” What are these “base assumption”s? (both in the argument I presented and in your alleged argument that makes a different conclusion). What would the base assumptions be?
>>And I’ll bow out as soon as you admit (just once on
>>this board) that not everyone on here that has
>>objected to your post is confused, and that this
>>argument proves the existence of God even though it
>>doesn’t do the same for the Easter Bunny.
>
>Sometimes spitting back what people said at them
>doesn't work. I don't assume that everyone that has
>objected to my posts is confused, and I'm certainly
>not presumptious enough to indicate it. So far Brian
>has been confused, Ben has been confused, and I've
>been confused as stated by YOU on many
>posts--particularly the ones in which we disagree with
>you. Disagreeing does not indicate confusion, as you
>seem to think.
It depends on the specific disagreement. You for instance seriously confuse the nature of conditionals if you think that the first premise presupposes the existence of God. Sometimes misunderstandings happen, particularly in very controversial topics. I do not claim that all disagreements are based on confusions, though occasionally that is indeed the case. When did I ever accuse Brian or Ben of confusing my points in this thread? Did Brian even enter in on the subject?
>>Breaking it down and paraphrasing it (correct me if I
>>have misunderstood you):
>>
>>Damoclese—The first premise (?If God exists,
>>then he necessarily exists) presupposes the existence
>>of God. After all, why use the first premise if God
>>doesn’t exist?
>
>That's sort of right. The he necessarily exists part
>is the only way to go if you use the If, as I pointed
>out above. I object to that, in the same way I would
>object to If god doesn't exist, then he (insert
>whatever claim here providing it doesn't conflict with
>non-existance) and the reason I object to that is
>because it cannot account for existance in this case.
It is true that the first premise by itself does not imply God’s existence. But so what? That premise (by itself) wasn’t supposed to.
>>Wade’s reply—To believe that the first premise
>>assumes the existence of God is to seriously confuse
>>the nature of conditionals. The statement “If G, then
>>[]G” does not at all presuppose G. In fact, G can be
>>false and it wouldn’t contradict the conditional.
>
>It would if you said If A not A. Let's code your
>argument in the way I understand it. G=God E=exists
>N=necessarily.
>
>If G E, Then G E N.
>
>As you can see, you could not logically have this
>statement If G E, Then not G E N which is a
>possibility. (god not existing is a possibility)
I’m not sure what relevance this has to anything. I did not use that conditional.
>>As
>>for the question asked, the matter is irrelevant. It
>>attacks the person holding the conditional to
>>be true, not the actual conditional. A monkey
>>could have randomly typed up the premise and it still
>>wouldn?t change the truth value of the conditional.
>
>But the veracity of the claims matter, as you seem to
>be using this as a definitive proof that shows the
>existance of God. If it were a proof that you admitted
>to be merely conditional instead of absolute, I
>wouldn't object to it, but that doesn't seem to be the
>case.
The conclusion “[]G” is not a conditional except in the sense that if the first two premises are true (“If G then []G” and “<>G”) then the conclusion is true. I’ve given arguments supporting the veracity of those premises. You have yet to even really attack any of the premise’s veracity.
>>Damoclese—Wade, you said so yourself that God
>>not existing is contradictory to the first premise,
>>when you realized that God not existing conflicted
>>with the conditional if he doesn’t, which you then
>>threw out.
>>
>>Wade?s reply—No, I never said that God not
>>existing was contradictory to the first premise. I
>>said that if we add the statement ~[]G (which, by the
>>way, isn?t the same as ~G and thus doesn?t literally
>>translate as ?God doesn?t exist?) we get a
>>contradiction because we get the statement ?The
>>greatest possible being cannot possibly exist.? If a
>>being is possible (e.g. the greatest possible
>>being)
>
>But we don't even know that God is "possible" anymore
>than say the Easter Bunny.
Of course we do. God is defined as the greatest possible being. Given this coherent meaning, it hardly makes any logical sense to say that the greatest possible being cannot possibly exist. Therefore, it is at least possible for God to exist. Is it logically possible for the Easter Bunny to exist? Well, yes. The Bunny’s existence doesn’t strike me as very likely, but it is possible if only in a nominal sense. The Easter Bunny’s existence does not contradict any principles of logic (such as the law of noncontradiction).
>Any untrue claim could
>conceivably be "possible" in some shape form or
>fashion.
Not in the sense I was referring to. For example, it is possible that there Julius Caesar never existed and that all documents pointing to his existence were forged a long time ago. This is possible, however unlikely it may seem, particularly since it doesn’t contradict any principles of logic. On the other hand, me existing and not existing at the same time not logically impossible because of its self-contradictory nature. So it’s not true that any untrue claim is possible.
>This part also refers back to the conditional
>which you append at the very end, if a being is
>possible. That's why it contradicts the if God exists
>bit. If he exists, he's certainly possible.
I think you need to clarify what you said here. What conditional I applied at the very end of the argument are you talking about? I did not have any conditional anywhere in the argument for any statement (call it p) where I said, “If <>p, then…”
>>it can’t be impossible. The greatest possible
>>being would by definition exist in at least one
>>possible world. So the contradiction didn’t
>>occur within the first premise. It happened
>>elsewhere.
>
>It did in the sense that if I say God exists, and
>later my argument says "god doesn't exist" I've made a
>completely useless argument.
Not at all! (If I am understanding you correctly.) If you did that you would have just provided an indirect proof for the nonexistence of God (provided that the premises are true).
>It's just the same as
>saying If it rains, it isn't raining.
You seem to be seriously confusing the nature of the first premise. The conclusion of the modified argument didn’t read, “If God exists, then he doesn’t exist.” Rather, the modified argument that I was referring to argues that given these two premises:
- If God exists, then he necessarily exists.
- It is possible for God not to exist.
Conclusion: God necessarily does not exist.
This conclusion is valid. It does not, however, imply in any way that, “If God exists, then he doesn’t exist,” but even if it did the argument would be nowhere near completely useless, especially for the atheist since it disproves God’s existence (given that the first two premises are correct). Of course, the conclusion can’t be true because we get a contradiction somewhere in the middle. We eventually get something that says a being that is possible (i.e. the greatest possible being) is not possible, so something in the argument is wrong.
On the other hand, let’s take a look at what the ontological argument I’ve brought forth says:
- If God exists, he exists necessarily.
- It is possible for God to exist.
Conclusion: God necessarily exists.
The argument says that if the first two premises are correct, then God must exist. The conclusion is not, “If God exists, then he exists necessarily.” That was a premise, not the conclusion. Rather, it says that if the first two premises are correct, then the conclusion must be correct also. Only those two premises are needed to arrive at the conclusion (in conjunction with the principles of logic), and neither of the two premises presupposes God’s existence. Furthermore, there was no, “God exists” statement to put into premise #1 to arrive at a modus ponens proof. You have yet to show any either of the two premises presupposes God’s existence.
Let me try to clear this up again. All the first premise says is, “If God exists, then he necessarily exists,” or “If G then []G.” The conditional as two parts: the antecedent (the “G”) and the consequent (the “[]G”). The first premise is, “If God exists, then he exists necessarily.” It is not “If God exists, then the premises below would be true.” Rather, the consequent is far more limited: []G. “If G, then []G.” This premise is not in any way inconsistent with ~G. The first premise is simply “If G, then []G.” That’s it. If that first premise is true, and if <>G is true, then []G is true. That’s exactly what I’m saying, and I’m right as I proved using the formal proof. The only way to avoid []G is to doubt at least one of the premises.
>your argument doesn't allow for non-existance by use
>of the conditional
The first premise does allow for the nonexistence. “If G, then []G” does not in any logical way contradict “~G,” nor does “~G” contradict <>G in any logical way. Recall that I made a modified form of the argument that did include an “If God doesn’t exist, then…” statement and the same conclusion was still reached.
>>Damoclese—The ontological argument you showed
>>us can be used to “prove” the existence of the Easter
>>Bunny. Therefore, the argument is flawed.
>>
>>Wade’s reply—It doesn’t quite prove the Easter
>>Bunny’s existence because the first premise doesn’t
>>hold true with the Easter Bunny, whereas I have given
>>arguments that attempt to explain why it holds true
>>for God.
>
>The reason's you've given are that "some people
>believe it."
No, that’s not the reason I’ve given. The justification that has been given is that the greatest possible being would by definition have the greatest possible form of existence: necessary existence. But there is nothing inherent in the concept of the Easter Bunny that makes the statement, “If the Easter Bunny exists, then he exists necessarily,” true.
>>Damoclese—If you take out the first premise (If
>>G, then []G) and replace it with it?s complement (If
>>~G, then ~[]G) one can disprove the existence of God.
>>
>>Wade’s reply—This is simply not true. One
>>cannot use that premise in conjunction with the second
>>to come up with ~G. If you believe it, I would like
>>to see the proof demonstrating your point.
>
>This one is wrong.
My apologies. I think the place where this started is in this post,
>So, the "proof" you put forward is only proof granting
>the first premise, if. We could construct a similar
>argument for the negative if God doesn't exist.
Well, yes. You could input a statement “If God doesn’t exist, then he does not necessarily exist.” I would not and do not disagree with that statement. But you couldn’t use that statement by itself to disprove God’s existence.
Now back to what you said:
>I was saying that if you take that
>premise and plug it into a different symbolical logic
>framework with different definations, you could could
>out with the argument that God doesn't exist.
I suppose it’s possible that one can use that premise in conjunction with some other premises to get a conclusion of God not existing, but it would only work if the argument were both valid (the conclusion logically follows from the premises) and sound (validity + all the premises, not just the first one, are true). I don’t think any such argument exists. If it does, please show it to me.
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