Author:
Wade A. Tisthammer
|
[
Next Thread |
Previous Thread |
Next Message |
Previous Message
]
Date Posted: 04/14/05 4:08pm
In reply to:
Damoclese
's message, "Inference to the explanation Wade likes" on 04/13/05 8:31pm
>>You’re missing the point. Already we humans
>>can do things that known natural processes cannot
>>(outside a pre-existing cell), such as making DNA and
>>RNA. It is entirely conceivable that there will be
>>known artificial causes to create life but no known
>>natural ones.
>
>Actually, I think you are missing the point. Even if
>we do ALL of that, we won't have "created" life. We'll
>have manipulated whatever made life to begin with, and
>the fact that we can manipulate what is already here
>doesn't really help advance one theory or the other.
Well, we manipulate what is already there to create computers, cars etc. that nature can’t reasonably produce. That we won’t have created life when we artificially create life does not seem logical.
Why did I mention it as ostensibly advancing one theory over the other? One: because (it seemed) that what you proposed as detecting intelligent design had to do with us seeing humans making something (e.g. artifacts) and not seeing nature make it. So, the purpose of this was to undercut that proposal/criticism. Two: here we will have one theory (artificial creation) that has a known cause and mechanisms, whereas the other theory will not have a known cause (naturalistic formation) and will still have many unresolved problems that the other theory accounts for and explains.
If such a circumstance arose (and I believe it inevitably will), why would one not accept ID? Because we just don’t like it philosophically?
> In that case, what does your apparent
>>proposal of detecting design (the “we’ve already seen
>>humans make these things” idea) say about this?
>
>It doesn't say anything about it, because humans don't
>"make" life
They did in the scenario I described. Humans already make DNA and RNA in ways nature can’t (e.g. through the use of man-made machinery).
>like they do a work of art or a watch. It
>simply means they manipulate what is already here due
>to whatever reason.
Well, when creating art or watches or any other machine we manipulate what is already there. We take pre-existing materials to make what we want. I’m not sure what point you’re trying to make here.
>>Why not? The old paradigm (e.g. organic evolution) is
>>hardly “rigorous” in any mathematical sense.
>
>That depends on what you mean by rigorous, but even if
>that were TOTALLY true, there are at least starting
>pieces of evidence such as the ability to create the
>fundamental building blocks of life in simulated
>natural ways that give organic evolution sway over
>some nameless faceless designer who can shift
>intentions and personalities if questions arise that
>it doesn't handle in a tidy way.
Except there are no known natural means to create life or even some of its fundamental molecules (e.g. DNA, RNA, AMP). That there exists natural means to create amino acids is a good start but not enough to hold sway over ID. ID still makes falsifiable and confirmed predictions that organic evolution doesn’t make. Can ID switch intentions and personalities? Due to the fact that we cannot identify the designer, yes. Can modern ID make predictions which, if falsified, put the theory in very serious trouble? Absolutely. The fact that modern ID can be falsified (more so, it seems, than organic evolution) gives it some sway over organic evolution.
> Indeed,
>>much of evolution (on the biochemical level) is
>>far from rigorous by having only handwaiving
>>explanations.
>
>You can misspell "hand waving" all you want
It’s actually a compound word. I originally saw it as being spelled “handwaiving” but a search on google also yields “handwaving” spelling also numerous times. In any case, the word that basically means glossing over relevant details or a complex point. (Sci-fi writers have been guilty of this.)
>but it
>doesn't change the fact that there is some pretty
>compelling rudimentary evidence that points towards
>organic evolution being pretty plausible.
This sounds like more handwaving, given the numerous unresolved problems and global disciplinary failure to find any possible means organic evolution could have happened. If organic evolution is to really work as a live scientific theory, it’ll need more than rhetoric (“plausible,” “compelling” etc.).
>>But design can be very rigorous in
>>principle (e.g. find a rigorous explanation how DNA
>>could be artificially made)
>
>In principle is not "in practice" and that is the
>problem.
Not in practice? We already have rigorous explanations how DNA could have been artificially made.
>>But if organic evolution is sufficiently
>>rational to believe it should be accepted as a
>>scientific theory, agreed?
>
>By rational if you mean evidence based, then yes.
Good. I for one believe it is a legitimate scientific theory even though I do not believe it is adequately supported evidentially.
>>Now, even if it was
>>rational to believe ID, science should pretend
>>not to know it?
>
>Well, the issue is that ID changes the designer in
>question around when the need arises.
Not at all. It makes almost no mention of what the designer is except that it exists.
>Yeah yeah, it
>doesn't POSIT a designer
You seem to drastically misunderstand ID. Of course it posits a designer.
>but because it doesn't POSIT
>a designer it loses the ability to be tested with
>regards to what we'd expect from a designer.
Message theory makes falsifiable predictions as to what we’d expect from the designer. I already gave you a couple examples.
>>Why?
>
>They follow a pattern of regularity.
That’s it? You need more than that to infer design in the explanatory filter. Mere “regularity” (depending upon the specifics of the data) is very susceptible to law/chance explanation.
>>But if that were true (the knowledge of their nature),
>>then it would stop in the “chance” node. Your
>>counterexample fails.
>
>If the filter worked, it would, but it doesn't.
You evidently don’t understand how the filter works. Remember my summary of it: if law/chance are inadequate, design is chosen. What you did is propose an example where law/chance were adequate, and if they indeed were, and the filter was given correct information, the filter would stop there and not choose design.
>The
>filter hangs because QM is a combination where
>randomnality produces a specific order that is
>regular. (design)
Not necessarily. If chance adequately explains it, then the filter would stop at the “chance” node, remember?
>The three questions would go
>something like does law explain this? No because laws
>don't describe random things. Does chance explain
>this? Well, there is order...and it IS regular, so no.
You appear to be inconsistent. You said chance does explain it (and I agree) and what you did here was feed inaccurate information to the filter (saying “no” to the “does chance explain this?” question). The mere existence of order is not enough to choose design, even in the explanatory filter. We have to see if law/chance can reasonably explain that order first. If they do, the filter does not select design (assuming its fed accurate information).
>>Well, if we know the nature of electrons would
>>reasonably produce that pattern, then law/chance would
>>have been chosen.
>
>But it's not really law or chance for the reasons I stated above.
>It's both. If you disagree as to why it is NOT both,
>then I'd challenge you to tell me why USING Dembski's model.
Ah, so that’s it. What happens in the filter if the event involves both laws and random chance like your example? Then it fits into one of the “chance” nodes (e.g. IP), because on the whole it has a finite chance of happening. Suppose an event simultaneously requires both cause L (chance = 100%) and cause C (chance = 30%). On the whole, the event fits into the IP category (because the odds of the event happening are 30%). At least, that’s how it works if I understand the filter correctly.
>>Even if true, it takes into account the situation
>>nonetheless and the filter is valid.
>
>That's like saying a piece of a pecan pie is the same
>as the WHOLE pie, which doesn't make any sense.
That’s like saying integral estimations are inaccurate because they don’t use all the data, which doesn’t make any sense.
>>No, because the evidence would still overwhelmingly
>>point to design.
>
>So if someone who had NEVER TOUCHED a deck of cards
>before in their life and had never been a magician
>before in their life interacted with a freshly opened
>pack of cards and muttered something about a pattern
>that then showed up, you'd still suspect design?
Given the specific circumstances of the scenario I defined yes. If the magician said in advance what the result would be (thus meeting the specification criterion) and after shuffling the deck thoroughly and the precise 52-card pattern showed up, I would have sufficiently rational reason not to attribute that order to chance.
>>>Yeah, but the fact that he is a MAGICIAN is not
>>>accounted for at all
>>
>>It is accounted for when deciding whether law/chance
>>is the most likely explanation.
>
>But that's what the model is for in the first place;
>it's supposed to make that determination not DECIDE it
>beforehand.
Ah, but in the scenario we must judge if the magician did it by chance (the random shuffling of the cards) or design (the magician employing some artifice).
>> And even if it
>>weren’t accounted for, the filter still succeeds and
>>the logic is still valid. Law and chance being
>>eliminated, design is chosen.
>
>Yeah, but so what?
So the filter is valid, which is the point I’ve been trying to make this entire thread. If law/chance are inadequate, design is chosen. I don’t see why this should be so controversial.
Nor have you given any reason why it should be. Your alleged counterexample involved a situation in which chance was adequate, thus the filter never would have chosen design. For a counterexample to really work, you’d need an example of an event in which neither law nor chance can adequately explain, but the answer is not design. Good luck with that.
Remember, the filter selects design only when both law and chance are inadequate.
>>>No, it isn't the most "rational" explanation.
>>
>>Really? I doubt you even believe the words you have
>>typed. Let’s recap the scenario. If the magician
>>said in advance what he was going to do, and after
>>shuffling the cards, the entire deck is in the precise
>>order he specified, you would really not think
>>“design” is the most rational explanation? Would you
>>think chance is responsible instead? I doubt it.
>
>I think design is the strongest inference, but no, I
>don't think it's the most rational. Inferences are not
>rational by definition.
You and I have very different definitions. When I say “infer” I mean “the act or process of inferring.” What is inferring? In the definition I am using, it means, “to derive as a conclusion from facts or premises.” There is nothing about this definition that implies that an inference can’t be rational or reasonable.
Now, given the scenario I described, is “design” the most reasonable explanation?
>>And just because the known physical laws are
>>consistent every time we test them doesn’t mean
>>they’re proven. But it’s certainly a good sign.
>
>Yeah, but this model is in conflict with research in
>psychology that HAS been consistent each time it was
>tested.
I’ve already dealt with this, given two reasons why this is flawed.
>>One: I was concerned primarily with the logical
>>validity of the filter, remember?
>
>But I wasn't primarily, remember?
Uh, okay.
> Two: your alleged
>>psychological claims seem dubious at best.
>
>Uh kay...
>
>
> >Suppose
>>that comparison with things we know are designed does
>>in fact occur. Well, the things that we know are
>>designed also happen to be things that the
>>currents of nature are not reasonably capable of
>>producing (e.g. cars, computers, artifacts).
>
>Not all things that are designed fall into that
>category. Art that mimics nature and vice-versa happen
>all the time.
Yep, but in general when we attribute design we don’t do so when nature is too easily capable of it. Suppose we find an icicle. It could be made artificially, but we generally don’t make a design inference.
Hence there is one weakness with the explanatory filter. It can (when given correct info) eliminate false positives, but it cannot eliminate false negatives.
>>If you
>>walked up to an archaeologist and claimed that
>>so-and-so artifact (e.g. Rosetta Stone) could have
>>been produced naturally, she’s likely to say something
>>along the lines of “not bloody likely.”
>
>Well yeah, because the Rosetta Stone is something that
>falls within my aforementioned observation that humans
>basically know the way other humans think, and
>language happens to be one of those things that
>indicate design.
Not only that, but the currents of nature just can’t reasonably account for it. Remember, I said could, not did. To repeat: If you walked up to an archaeologist and claimed that so-and-so artifact (e.g. Rosetta Stone) could have been produced naturally, she’s likely to say something along the lines of “not bloody likely.”
>>Ha! The Smithsonian has lots of artifacts with no
>>known purpose but are obviously designed.
>
>Just because their purpose is not known simply means
>that while we recognize humans could use this thing
>for some sort of utility, we don't know exactly which
>utility it was used for.
Fine, but irrelevant to the point I was making. You said:
>One of the reasons
>we know they are designed is because they have utility
>be they mathematical, aesthetic, or language oriented.
Life may have no known purpose but could just as easily fall into one of these categories (e.g. aesthetic). Just because we don’t know for certain the purpose is not problematic.
>However, what we do know is
>that this thing falls within the expectations of what
>humans make as we've seen things that are similar
>before that ARE made by humans.
And again, life can just as easily fit this category (humans can make life), thus undercutting this objection. What if we see humans make life from its basic components but there are still no known natural means and the old paradigm still has its unresolved problems? What then?
Additionally, you have repeatedly avoided an important question of mine that I would (please) like you to answer. How long should we put up with the current paradigm’s unresolved problems before we switch to the new paradigm that solves (and even predicts) those kinds of problems? How many more decades of fruitless research in resolving the problems with the current paradigm should continue before accepting ID? Thirty years? A century? Never? Should we just accept the old paradigm no matter what?
I believe it is perfectly acceptable to try and solve the old paradigm's problems before switching to a new one. But at some point I think we must give up the old paradigm if the problems remain unresolved (given a new paradigm that solves those problems etc.).
>>False. It predicts the designer would make things
>>that (among other things) resist naturalistic
>>explanation.
>
>Now why would a designer do that in the first place?
>See, this is the sort of thing that makes ID a useless
>theory. It assumes things without much reason to do so.
Like it or not, modern ID theory makes these kinds of testable and falsifiable predictions. And there is reason to believe about this aspect of the designer: lots of unresolved problems with naturalistic explanations.
>>This makes are design inference strong
>>because (among other things) there are empirically
>>falsifiable predictions.
>
>Yeah, but they are baseless. Why couldn't a designer
>make something that is explained by naturalistic laws?
Because it would contradict modern ID theory (the filter would never choose “design”). Also, things that are designed often fit into this category anyway (things that can’t be reasonably explained by law/chance). There’s another reason: this brand of ID makes testable and falsifiable predictions. Just as it is best to accept only those evolutionary theories that are the most testable and are more falsifiable, so too is it best to accept only ID theories of this sort.
It bears repeating: we prefer a form of ID theory that is testable and falsifiable (just as we prefer forms of evolutionary theory that are testable and falsifiable). Hence, current ID theory is this: “Within biology, intelligent design is a theory of biological origins and development. Its fundamental claim is that intelligent causes are necessary to explain the complex, information-rich structures of biology and that these causes are empirically detectable.” This theory, of course, makes falsifiable predictions. There’s nothing inherently wrong with having a theory that makes falsifiable predictions.
>>How about organic evolution?
>> Lately it seems awfully non-falsifiable.
>
>I think it's very falsifiable as of yet.
Really? Let’s see what happens with a couple of examples:
>>Don’t have
>>the starting conditions here? Well, maybe it
>>originated naturally in space.
>
>And it COULD have, but it's acknowledged as a COULD.
True, but my point is that this observation does not falsify the theory.
>>Lots of problems of organic evolution?
>>That’s okay, because there are solutions and we just
>>haven’t discovered them yet etc.
>
>I don't think any scientist really believes there are
>solutions that will TOTALLY bear out organic evolution
>in its current form.
I didn’t say “current form,” nonetheless it is true that this ad hoc hypothesis can (and has) been used to prevent the empirical falsification of organic evolution. My point remains the same: this observation does nothing to falsify the theory of organic evolution. Hence my claim that organic evolution seems awfully non-falsifiable.
>>Give me one bit of
>>empirical data and I bet I could explain it away
>>easily (playing devil’s advocate of organic
>>evolution).
>
>I'm sure you could, but the beauty of science is that
>you could do it for only as long as the absence of
>evidence allowed you to.
The problem with organic evolution is that this will always happen. Look at both examples I made: neither observation can falsify the theory. So what could?
>>In contrast, modern ID theory seems
>>much more at risk with empirical data. By
>>philosophy of science, it’s organic evolution that
>>doesn’t seem to be much of a scientific theory.
>
>You hold organic evolution as though it is on the same
>level as gravity, and of course it isn't. It's a
>theory in the infantile state which means it's still
>subject to massive revisions. It simply has more going
>for it than ID as I pointed out above.
Where? I claim that modern ID has at least this more going for it: it is much more empirically falsifiable.
>>So you claim. But would you still accept organic
>>evolution in spite of the evidence?
>
>I accept organic evolution very tentatively.
That’s nice. But you still didn’t answer my question. Given the scenario I depicted earlier: life began to exist and the odds of organic evolution being true are less than one in a trillion. Would you still accept organic evolution in spite of the evidence?
>>Given
>>life had a beginning and that organic evolution is
>>almost certainly false, why not accept design
>>as the most reasonable explanation?
>
>Because organic evolution is not "almost certainly
>false"
You quoted me out of context. Given the scenario the quote was referring to, why not accept design as the most reasonable explanation?
>and the choices on this test are not a)
>organic evolution or b) design.
Perhaps you can point to another?
>It
>seems to win the game because the premises are cast in
>such a way that at the end it of course seems to
>emerge the victor.
Yes, the form of ID chosen is testable and falsifiable. Dembski did indeed define a theory called “intelligent design” that makes falsifiable predictions. But so what? I wouldn’t blame evolutionists for choosing forms of evolutionary theory that are testable and falsifiable. The “premises” are an inherent and unavoidable part of nearly any scientific theory. For instance, atomic theory uses its premises to fit the data (the Bohr model rejected in place of something else etc.). The specifics of the theory are often what makes it scientific, testable, and able to make falsifiable predictions. It is something to be commended, not criticized.
>>Do I detect the odor of tenacity?
>
>Nope, but it wouldn't hurt to check your armpits.
Let’s take the entire quote in context:
But would you still accept organic evolution in spite of the evidence? And I think design in this case is more than just a possibility; it is the most reasonable possibility. Given life had a beginning and that organic evolution is almost certainly false, why not accept design as the most reasonable explanation? It makes falsifiable predictions, all of its predictions are very well confirmed, and it seems to win the game of inference to the best explanation.
Do I detect the odor of tenacity?
The last question was in anticipation that you would still accept organic evolution. But perhaps I have misunderstood you (as you have misunderstood me on more than one occasion). If you would still accept organic evolution in spite of the evidence, wouldn’t your views seem a little tenacious (i.e. very reluctant to let go of the belief)?
>>A similar thing is true for ID. Message theory
>>predicts organisms would have similar components,
>>which is evidence for message theory (thus having
>>other supportive evidence).
>
>And why, pray tell, would organisms have similar
>components under message theory?
As I explained before, because they are made by the same designer.
[
Next Thread |
Previous Thread |
Next Message |
Previous Message
]
|
Feedback: 