| Subject: The Unjust Bombing of Hiroshima |
Author:
MikeKnight
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Date Posted: 11:55:52 01/01/02 Tue
In reply to:
Paul Musgrave
's message, ""Unjust" Bombing of Hiroshima" on 22:28:11 12/30/01 Sun
Date Posted: 16:24:26 12/31/01 Mon
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First, two compliments and second, an argument: Musgrave’s website is excellent, I’m adding a link section, his thesis and refutation to my arguments were convincing, however, they were simply not true. Granted, my analysis in “The Unjust Bombing of Hiroshima” is somewhat lacking, however I will expand on the essay in this forum.
Musgrave’s thesis relies on the fact that “if two courses of action will win a war, the one which kills fewer people is more desirable and desirable and therefore just.” He later asserts that all strategic goals were met with minimum costs. Even using Musgrave’s own definitions, I will show you while his analysis is simply flawed. What were those two courses of action? Was it dropping the A-bomb versus an invasion of the island? These were not the only two choices the American’s could make. Diplomacy, as advocated by Secretary of War Stimson, was the more “just” option. No further lives would have been lost.
Before going into a detailed course of action that should be taken, I must refute Musgrave’s assertions that the state of Japan at the time “did not imply they ‘were going to surrender soon.’” The Japanese were going to surrender soon, as Leo Szilard argued. However, Musgrave questions the authority of Szilard and his assertions that other atomic scientists were equally concerned, so we’ll use some of his citations against him. Musgrave references General Curtis LeMay; one who argued the war was going to be over soon anyway. Michael Sherry in The Rise of American Power reminds us that when Air Force chief General Hap asked in June 1945 when the war was going to end, General LeMay told him September or October 1945, because the majority of industrial targets had already been hit. So maybe Szilard was wrong: the war was going to end sooner than 1946. So you think LeMay is simply a cocky general trying to show off to his mentors? Well, Admiral William Leahy, Chief of Staff wrote, “By the beginning of September 1944, Japan was almost completely defeated through a practically complete sea and air blockade.” In other words, mainly through diplomacy and simple economics, the Japanese empire was crumbing. Additionally, the Japanese Foreign Minister himself, Togo, told Japan’s ambassador to Moscow, Sato, in mid-July to make it clear to the Soviets that, “It is His Majesty’s heart’s desire to see swift termination of the war.” (The message was sent to Moscow because Japan had a neutrality pact with Russia). Truman already knew of this statement before Stalin sent him a telegram, but Truman flatly ignored the issue. Still not believe me? Well, a study mandate by Truman in 1946 entitled The United States Strategic Bombing Survey declared, “Based on a detailed investigation of the all the facts and supported by the testimony of the surviving Japanese leaders involved, it is the Survey’s opinion that certainly prior to 31 December 1945 and in all probability prior to 1 November 1945, would have surrendered even if the atomic bombs had not been dropped, even if Russia had not entered the war, and even if no invasion had been planned.” In final analysis, the Japanese were bent on defeat and surrender: the A-Bombs were unnecessary.
Musgrave tries to refute my argument that the Japanese citizen’s were collateral damage by stating that conventional bombings of other targets inside Japan were far worse than the atrocities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki combined. Unfortunately, civilian targets were not a necessity in August 1945. Indeed, Gar Alperovitz writes in The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb “on July 25 a new targeting directive had been issued with which altered bombing priorities. Attacks on urban centers became the fourth priority, after railway targets, aircraft production, and ammunition deposits.” Again I go back to Stimson’s Memoirs: Only 40% of all armed forces were in the home islands. It is clear that the small amount of armed forces in Japan and the production capability of the Japanese was severely limited already. An atomic bomb being dropped on Hiroshima was not necessary in any way.
So what was the solution? Bomb the Japanese to submission using incendiary bombs? Or invade the homeland? Would the Japanese simply say “Okay we give up?” Or was it going to be “months and years of bloody combat and counter-guerilla operations,” as suggested by Musgrave? Historian and formal naval officer Martin Sherwin has summarized the situation stating, “the choice in the summer of 1945 was not between conventional invasion or nuclear war. It was a choice between various forms of diplomacy and warfare.” The real issue in the surrendering of the Japanese was the fate of the Emperor himself: Japan wanted to preserve his power, as he was god like. What the United States should have done to end the war was to listen to Stimson and Sherwin and have a different message come out of the Potsdam conference. Stimson and Truman had discussed a proposal to call for Japan to surrender. Stimson wrote to Truman in a memo, “I personally think that if in saying this we should add that we do not exclude constitutional monarchy under the present dynasty, it would substantially add to the chances of acceptance.” Unfortunately, Potsdam did not mention this and the Japanese were still concerned about their emperor. Even if we did not give a different message at Potsdam, what the United States needed to do was three-pronged: give a warning of an atomic bomb that could destroy cities, reassert the continuity of a constitutional monarchy, and, possibly, continue incendiary bombing on industrial targets.
Musgrave, in his concluding arguments, tries to frighten everyone into submission and uses botched historical analogies to prove guerrilla fighting would continue: he compares the situation to the Filipino’s, etc. However this is NOT a certainty, and is backed up with no evidence whatsoever. To see the fallacy in his logic, all you have to do is look at the situation in several other situations were diplomacy has worked: in the aftermath of a Boris Yeltsin takeover, was there armed resistance and guerilla fighting? And if the emperor were to remain and claim the war is “over” would the Japanese people, who worshiped the emperor, disobey him? Not likely. The atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki was unjust, even using Musgrave’s definitions: The Japanese would have surrendered, little to no more American troops had to be lost, and innocent Japanese would not have had to die painful deaths of cancer and exposure to radiation. Diplomacy was the moral and just response to Japan in the mid to later months of 1945.
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