| Subject: Cutting to the chase |
Author:
Damoclese
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Date Posted: 04/24/02 2:22pm
In reply to:
Wade A. Tisthammer
's message, "I'll try to keep mine as well." on 04/24/02 11:59am
>
>
>>>>This argument assumes those primitive concepts
>>>>exist,(at least as a logical possibility) whether or
>>>>not you wish to admit it, and that really is the
>>>>bottom line.
>>>
>>>They don?t have to assume that the concepts exist
>even
>>>on a logical possibility. There is nothing in
>>>definitions of conditional statements that imply that
>>>at all. (Confer indirect proofs.)
>>
>>If they don't exist in the world as a logical
>>possibility, then there really isn't any need to talk
>>about them or address them with logic.
>
>That?s not always true. Indirect proofs are one
>example, as is modus tollens. Even if you are
>correct, it is irrelevant to the problem since God (as
>defined for these purposes) is a logical possibility
>and this was explicitly stated in the second premise
>(~[]~G, which is the same as <>G). In any case, it is
>possible for a conditional to hold true even if the
>antecedent is false. Thus the truthfulness of the
>conditional does not imply the truth of the
>antecedent, much less presuppose it. Do you have any
>reason to think otherwise?
In the frame of your argument I do. (more later)
>
>Not necessarily. ?If I get shot by death rays, then
>death rays exist.? This is a true conditional, and so
>?If I get shot by death rays, then I will be dead,?
>also is correct. While both conditionals are true,
>neither affirm the antecedent, i.e. the truthfulness
>of the conditionals do not imply that death rays
>exist. In any case, it is irrelevant to the problem.
>The first premise starts out ?If God exists??
>so the conditional does not at all presuppose God?s
>existence. As I pointed out before, it is quite
>possible for G to be false and the conditional to be
>true.
But here is the catch... if I start with the conditional If death rays exist, and my then is death rays don't exist, I've generated a contradiction or at the very least a useless conditional. To do anything productive with it, the pieces that follow If death rays exist cannot deny the existance of death rays to being with, otherwise, the argument could just as well have never have been asserted.
>
>No, I never said that God not existing was
>contradictory to the first premise. I said that if we
>add the statement ~[]G (which, by the way, isn?t the
>same as ~G and thus doesn?t literally translate as
>?God doesn?t exist?) we get a contradiction because we
>get the statement ?The greatest possible being cannot
>possibly exist.? If a being is possible (e.g. the
>greatest possible being) it can?t be
>impossible. The greatest possible being would by
>definition exist in at least one possible world. So
>the contradiction didn?t occur within the first
>premise. It happened elsewhere.
But the greatest possible being rests on the idea of "If god exists" which you haven't substatiated at all, and also you seem to never address my criticism of using a conditional which is what I was talking about but didn't articulate very well. Let me show you again why this argument is a little bit less than honest:
God is the biggest existing entity.
If God ceased to exist, it would be the greatest non-existance. (notice here I can't say if god ceased to exist, he exists because I get a meaningless sentence. The second part must affirm the if. Similary, I can't say if it rains outside, it isn't raining. Instead, I'd say, If it rains outside, I'll bring an umbrella.)
Therefore, God's nonexistance is the greatest nonexistance.
(notice how my conclusion sounds like a definitive statement about God, but in reality rests on the conditional if, also notice that my conclusion remarkably doesn't affirm the existance of God, because it cannot, for it would invalidate the If God ceased to exist part). If I decided to carry out my argument the way you have, I could say and "there you have it, God's nonexistance is the greatest nonexistance" and it sounds like what I'm really saying is that I've proven that God doesn't exist, when in actuality I haven't. All I've done is make an argument contigent on a conditional.
>
>God is proved if the first premises are true. I have
>given justification for their truthfulness. Why think
> that justification fails? And how can you possibly
>prove the existence of the Easter Bunny using the same
>sort of logical structure that the ontological
>argument used?
Some people feel that the Easter Bunny has the greatest possible existance. Who am I to question them? After all, they are "some people".
I think the justification fails because first of all I see no reason to base an argument on what "some people" think or do not think. Some people think that they are Jesus. Should I construct an argument with that and then introduce a proposition about "if they are jesus"? No, it'd be stupid to go about it that way, when I don't know if they are Jesus or not to begin with. It would be exceptionally dim of me to then announce I'd proven Jesus had existed based upon those assumptions.
>First, it?s not ?my? style. I am not the one who
>formulated this argument of symbolic logic. Second,
>the Easter Bunny has not been proved for the
>same reason I explained earlier. The Easter Bunny
>ontological argument would be valid all right, but it
>would not be sound because the first premise would not
>be true. The statement ?If the Easter Bunny exists,
>he exists necessarily? is not correct. Whereas some
>claim that the two premises do hold true for
>theism for reasons I have already explained.
"Some" ardent believers in the Easter Bunny feel they do. I guess that proves it. Case closed.
>
>That depends on how you define ?God.? If ?God? is
>defined in the way this ontological argument, then the
>defined version is correct. Out of curiosity, how do
>you define God?
I define God as a concept, particularly a concept with no force behind it. I also treat leprechauns the same way. It too is a concept. There would be no need to even mention leprechauns had someone not introduced the terminology because they don't exist. That's the strange thing about human language, we tend to introduce lots of things that don't exist in the first place.
>
>You would lose the bet. The statement ?If God doesn?t
>exist, he doesn?t exist necessarily,? cannot be used
>in conjunction with the first premise to reach the
>conclusion of God not existing. If it can, I?d like
>to know how it can be done.
I didn't say that it could be directly substituted into the framework your argument rests in. I said (or at least meant) one could if they were so inclined, shift the base assumption around and then build an entirely different symbolic argument using perhaps the same rules or modulations of them, and come out with an argument to the contrary. So then, I'd ask you, which of you would be right? You've both used the same system, and come out with different answers?
.
>
>And I?ll bow out as soon as you admit (just once on
>this board) that not everyone on here that has
>objected to your post is confused, and that this
>argument proves the existence of God even though it
>doesn?t do the same for the Easter Bunny.
Sometimes spitting back what people said at them doesn't work. I don't assume that everyone that has objected to my posts is confused, and I'm certainly not presumptious enough to indicate it. So far Brian has been confused, Ben has been confused, and I've been confused as stated by YOU on many posts--particularly the ones in which we disagree with you. Disagreeing does not indicate confusion, as you seem to think.
Your argument does a lousy job of proving God's existance, just as my argument does a lousy job of proving his greatest non-existance. In fact, your argument doesn't "prove" anything, it only "assumes a lot".
>
>In any case, I don?t see how the argument can prove
>the existence of the Easter Bunny given that the first
>premise is clearly flawed. I?ll admit that the
>ontological argument doesn?t work if you can similarly
>show that the first premise is flawed when applied to
>the definition of God I used. As for the first claim,
>David does not seem all that confused in regards to
>understanding the ontological argument.
If David accepts the underlying assumptions you've made, bully for him. I don't. I see no reason to accept it based on what "some people" think. I see no proof in a claim that says if God...anything. I see a tentative proof, or a proof that MIGHT BE, but not an affirmtive definitive proof. (even though you seem to treat it that way)
>
>Breaking it down and paraphrasing it (correct me if I
>have misunderstood you):
>
>Damoclese?The first premise (?If God exists,
>then he necessarily exists) presupposes the existence
>of God. After all, why use the first premise if God
>doesn?t exist?
That's sort of right. The he necessarily exists part is the only way to go if you use the If, as I pointed out above. I object to that, in the same way I would object to If god doesn't exist, then he (insert whatever claim here providing it doesn't conflict with non-existance) and the reason I object to that is because it cannot account for existance in this case.
>
>Wade?s reply?To believe that the first premise
>assumes the existence of God is to seriously confuse
>the nature of conditionals. The statement ?If G, then
>[]G? does not at all presuppose G. In fact, G can be
>false and it wouldn?t contradict the conditional.
It would if you said If A not A. Let's code your argument in the way I understand it. G=God E=exists N=necessarily.
If G E, Then G E N.
As you can see, you could not logically have this statement If G E, Then not G E N which is a possibility. (god not existing is a possibility)
As
>for the question asked, the matter is irrelevant. It
>attacks the person holding the conditional to
>be true, not the actual conditional. A monkey
>could have randomly typed up the premise and it still
>wouldn?t change the truth value of the conditional.
But the veracity of the claims matter, as you seem to be using this as a definitive proof that shows the existance of God. If it were a proof that you admitted to be merely conditional instead of absolute, I wouldn't object to it, but that doesn't seem to be the case.
>
>
>Damoclese?Wade, you said so yourself that God
>not existing is contradictory to the first premise,
>when you realized that God not existing conflicted
>with the conditional if he doesn?t, which you then
>threw out.
>
>Wade?s reply?No, I never said that God not
>existing was contradictory to the first premise. I
>said that if we add the statement ~[]G (which, by the
>way, isn?t the same as ~G and thus doesn?t literally
>translate as ?God doesn?t exist?) we get a
>contradiction because we get the statement ?The
>greatest possible being cannot possibly exist.? If a
>being is possible (e.g. the greatest possible
>being)
But we don't even know that God is "possible" anymore than say the Easter Bunny. Any untrue claim could conceivably be "possible" in some shape form or fashion. This part also refers back to the conditional which you append at the very end, if a being is possible. That's why it contradicts the if God exists bit. If he exists, he's certainly possible.
it can?t be impossible. The greatest possible
>being would by definition exist in at least one
>possible world. So the contradiction didn?t
>occur within the first premise. It happened elsewhere.
It did in the sense that if I say God exists, and later my argument says "god doesn't exist" I've made a completely useless argument. It's just the same as saying If it rains, it isn't raining. It's hollow, and your argument doesn't allow for non-existance by use of the conditional unless your intention was to make a hollow shell of an argument (which is evidentally not what it was).
>
>
>Damoclese?The ontological argument you showed
>us can be used to ?prove? the existence of the Easter
>Bunny. Therefore, the argument is flawed.
>
>Wade?s reply?It doesn?t quite prove the Easter
>Bunny?s existence because the first premise doesn?t
>hold true with the Easter Bunny, whereas I have given
>arguments that attempt to explain why it holds true
>for God.
The reason's you've given are that "some people believe it." "Some" people claim that about the Easter Bunny too. Does that make it right?
So far, you have yet to even rebut them, and
>you have yet to give reasons for thinking that any of
>the first two premises are false.
You are right, it's hard to rebut an observation about what "Some people think", but it isn't hard to rebut their thoughts.
>
>
>Damoclese?If you take out the first premise (If
>G, then []G) and replace it with it?s complement (If
>~G, then ~[]G) one can disprove the existence of God.
>
>Wade?s reply?This is simply not true. One
>cannot use that premise in conjunction with the second
>to come up with ~G. If you believe it, I would like
>to see the proof demonstrating your point.
This one is wrong. I was saying that if you take that premise and plug it into a different symbolical logic framework with different definations, you could could out with the argument that God doesn't exist.
Damoclese
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