| Subject: Trying to keep my patience |
Author:
Damoclese
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Date Posted: 04/18/02 7:06pm
In reply to:
Wade A. Tisthammer
's message, "Attempting to get a strait answer." on 04/18/02 1:14pm
>
>
>>It doesn't make any sense to use a
>>conditional about something that doesn't exist, just
>>like it doesn't make any sense to use it on the Easter
>>Bunny.
>
>It can indeed. Indirect proofs and reductio ad
>absurdum are some usages of using conditional
>statements of things that do not or cannot exist.
There may be times in mathematics and other branches when this is true, but the existance of God is hardly theoretical mathematics. Besides, there is much controversy about the application of indirect proofs and the movement of logical positivism stands as testament to this fact.
>
>>This argument assumes those primitive concepts
>>exist,(at least as a logical possibility) whether or
>>not you wish to admit it, and that really is the
>>bottom line.
>
>They don’t have to assume that the concepts exist even
>on a logical possibility. There is nothing in
>definitions of conditional statements that imply that
>at all. (Confer indirect proofs.)
If they don't exist in the world as a logical possibility, then there really isn't any need to talk about them or address them with logic. Philosophers have often examined the application of a negative logical statement, and from what I've seen they've indicated that though those things may not exist in reality, that they exist as a logical possibility. In other words, logic sees things from a different standpoint than we do in reality. However, just because something is a logical possibility doesn't mean it is any more real than Santa--another logical possiblity. From this viewpoint some philosophers (and myself) find that if a statement isn't applicable to reality and asserts something about something that doesn't exist (excluding the branches of theoretical mathematical disciplines)or makes statements about something that doesn't exist, you might just as well not have stated it to begin with. Why talk about neon camels, purple faries, or that pink skunk? As soon as you've said it, you've affirmed the existance of something that doesn't exist in the first place, so why say it in the first place?
>It is functionally the same. Take the antecedent of
>the statement: “If I get shot by death rays” logically
>presupposes the “If death rays exist” conditional as
>part of the statement. In any case, even if your
>criticism were true it would not apply to the
>one the ontological argumuent used, which is,
>“If God exists, then…” It blatently includes
>the condition that the statement holds true if
>God exists.
No, it isn't functionally the same, and if you think it is, you should try to slide it by a logic professor. If I get shot by death rays is a conditional that refers to whether or not one gets shot, the death rays are not in question. The only question is, will I or won't I get shot by death rays? If death rays exist is entirely different which calls into question death rays, but only attests to the affirmtive case, in other words, by using the words if death rays exist, one has committed themselves to an affirmitive conclusion of death rays exist, because otherwise a contradiction will be generated.
>>
>As a thought experiment, or an indirect proof etc.
>But in any case, your question is completely
>irrelevant as it pertains to the truth of the premise.
A proof that claims something is true when in reality it isn't isn't a very good proof wouldn't you say?
> The origins and motives of the statement don’t
>matter. My motives could be utterly insane and it
>wouldn’t change the statement’s truth-value. A monkey
>could be the one who randomly typed up the statement
>and it wouldn’t change the statement’s truth-value.
>Remember, the premise only says “If God exists,
>then he exists necessarily.” God not existing is not
>in any way contradictory to the premise.
Yes it is, you said so yourself when you realized that God not existing conflicted with the conditional of if he does, which you then threw out.
Because of
>this, the statement does not presuppose the existence
>of God unless you can clearly explain to me how the
>statement “God does not exist” contradicts the premise.
You were the one who pointed it out.
>>
>>
>>Nor could you use the other to affirm God's existance,
>
>You could in conjunction with another premise, as I
>have already proved. I did use a formal proof
>to demonstrate this after all. Do you have any shred
>of evidence whatsoever that the proof is unsound? If
>not, I suggest you bow out of this discussion.
Ahh, but Wade, the truth of your claim doesn't matter. You haven't proved anything besides that the argument with its presuppositions is logically consistant. You haven't proven the existance of God with this argument anymore than I could have proven the existance of the Easter Bunny with an if conditional.
You like to use that "shred of evidence" phrase, and the "You seemed confused phrase" fairly often. Maybe you think it strengthens your case, that it makes it look like your argument is extra compelling, but it really doesn't fool the people on here who know better, so why don't you take it somewhere else?
>
>You could not prove statements like the existence of
>the Easter Bunny because the premises just wouldn’t
>hold true. The statement “If the Easter Bunny exists,
>he exists necessarily” is not correct. Whereas some
>claim that the two premises do hold true for
>theism for reasons I have already explained.
Wade, if you cannot see that my analogy with the Easter Bunny is exactly the same as your "proof" for God then I'm not going to hold your hand and show you each step of the way how both do the same job. All you would have to do is replace the words God with "easter bunny" throughout your entire proof, and presto, the easter bunny has been proven in traditional Wade style.
>
>On the contrary, there is a very good reason to do so.
> The form of theism I’m referring to does
>define God as the greatest possible being. Ask this
>theist, “What are you referring to when you say,
>‘God’? How do you define God? What exactly is
>God?” and the theist would reply, “the greatest
>possible being.” Here, God quite literally is
>the greatest possible being. Note also that this
>definition does not really point to any theistic
>belief system in particular. There are many such
>systems, not just Christianity, that contain a notion
>of the greatest possible being. I’m not specifically
>referring to the Christian God when discussing the
>ontological argument I’ve told you about.
There isn't any reason to assume that that brand of theism or any other that holds that God is the highest being is the correct way to view God.
>>
>>Let me break this down for you very clearly so as
>>there isn't any more resulting confusion. Your proof
>>doesn't matter to a hill of beans if there isn't a
>>God. It doesn't matter how you define God initially,
>>it doesn't matter if you used symbolic logic, it
>>doesn't matter if you use propostional calculus, it
>>doesn't matter if you issue five hundred postulates
>>about what should follow if God exists. You can build
>>intricate towers of logic about if this and this, but
>>it doesn't matter if the base assumption is wrong. I
>>question your first premise If God exists, just as you
>>would question a premise If God doesn't exist.
>>Something can be valid and it can still be "wrong" if
>>the base assumptions are wrong.
>
>Evidently there is still confusion. The first premise
>does not, repeat, Not, and to repeat
>again, does NOT presuppose
>the existence of God, and you have yet to provide any
>shred of evidence to demonstrate otherwise. Yes, the
>argument would be wrong if God doesn’t exist, just
>like many scientists would be wrong if gravity doesn’t
>exist. But scientists can only be wrong about gravity
>if they have somehow misinterpreted the seemingly
>overwhelming supporting evidence, and God can only
>not exist if one of the two premises is wrong,
>and you have yet to demonstrate that any of the two
>premises are wrong.
That's right. The If god exists part, he exists necessarily. If God doesn't exist, he doesn't exist necessarily. Take that logic line out, extend it, and I'll bet you find a conclusion that is contradictory to yours. Since you've thrown contradictions out in your argument, I'd assume you'd throw both lines of reasoning away. It isn't necessarily the premises that are wrong, as the presuppositions they make.
>
>So if you think the proof is unsound, please explain
>to me clearly what is wrong with the fist two
>premises. For a recap, the first two premises
>are:- If God exists, then he exists
>necessarily. - It is possible for God to
>exist.
The purpose of the proof was to show that
>the statement, “God necessarily exists” must be
>true if the first two premises are true. And the
>proof is quite valid (i.e. the conclusion must be true
>if the premises are true). If you can’t give any
>shred of evidence for doubting those two premises,
>then I suggest you bow out.
I'll bow out as soon as you admit (just once on this board) that not everyone on here that has objected to your post is confused, and that this argument does not prove the existance of God anymore than one for the Easter Bunny would. Judging from your past history, I have a feeling I'll be here for awhile.
Damoclese
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